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ABSTRACT 
 
 In this thesis, I investigate the relationship between black-white residential 
segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas, and the amount of political fragmentation within 
the metro area.  Using the dissimilarity index calculated by metropolitan statistical area 
(MSA) at the census track level as a measure of segregation and measures of 
fragmentation based on ‘places’ as defined by the U.S. Census, I perform multivariate 
regression analyses to ascertain the strength and relationship fragmentation has on 
segregation.  In addition, I analyze the inclusion of alternative measures of segregation 
and fragmentation for comparative purposes.  The results indicate that while the effect of 
fragmentation can vary depending on operationalization used there is a mild to moderate 
relationship between dissimilarity and political fragmentation, thus indicating that higher 
levels of political fragments in an MSA are associated with higher levels of residential 
segregation.  Some measures of fragmentation proved to be more fruitful than others but 
reaffirm for all measures of segregation that higher levels of political fragmentation are 
associated with residential segregation. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is an investigation of whether greater levels of political fragmentation 
within metropolitan areas lead to higher levels of race and ethnic residential segregation.  
The literature on residential segregation, one of the oldest empirical research traditions 
in sociology, is extensive and has cumulated over nearly a century.  Many prominent 
researchers have undertaken studies of residential segregation, its causes, and its 
implications (Massey & Mullan 1984; Weiher 1991; Feagin 1998; Massey & Denton 
1993).  This study will examine the role of one factor that may relate to residential 
segregation namely, the political subdivision or fragmentation of urban space and how it 
may affect the differential spatial distribution of social groups in an area.   
Residential segregation has a long history in the U.S. and has been carefully 
documented in a large research literature including quantitative, qualitative, and 
historical studies and spanning many decades.  Following the passage of the Fair 
Housing Act in 1968, many, particularly many in the lay public, assumed that residential 
segregation and the problems associated with it were solved and a thing of the fading 
past (Massey and Denton 1993).  In the U.S., the Fair Housing Act was in fact a turning 
point for housing discrimination, and researchers have shown that trends of declining 
residential segregation followed its passage and continue into recent decades (Iceland, 
Weinberg, and Steinmetz 2002).  However, trends of declining segregation are modest at 
best indicating that certain ongoing social processes continue to maintain ethnic 
segregation.  This backdrop makes it plausible to hypothesize that segregation continues 
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in part because racism and discrimination work indirectly through regulations such as 
zoning laws and through the establishment and revision of political boundaries of 
various kinds that serve to separate ethnic populations in urban areas. 
The most immediate goal of this study is to examine the relationship between 
political fragments and residential segregation.  But the motivation for examining this 
relationship springs from an interest in a more general hypothesis that political 
fragments may serve as mechanisms through which the impact of racism and 
discrimination coalesces.  Although I am guided by this “background” hypothesis, it is 
important to note that inferences regarding the operation of racism and discrimination 
will necessarily be indirect because currently, there are no measurements available to 
permit one to directly examine how racism and discrimination vary across metropolitan 
areas.  I will draw upon relevant qualitative and historical evidence in order to speculate 
about the role of racism and discrimination.   
This study will analyze the role that political fragments play in shaping variation 
in residential segregation, between non-Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks, across 
metropolitan areas.  Political fragments, such as suburban and urban divisions, and the 
proliferation of zoning regulations within them, carry the potential to maintain or foster 
higher levels of residential segregation (Byun and Esparza 2005).  Political fragments 
include governmental jurisdictions and administrative boundaries.  Some examples of 
relevant political fragments include county and city governments, local community 
governments, and school districts.  Zoning regulations include building restrictions that 
maintaining certain types of populations, lifestyles, and land-use patterns within the 
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particular area in question.  For example, zoning an area as residential and restricted to 
single-family, detached housing with a minimum lot size of one-half acre ensures that an 
area will have low population density, and a population consisting primarily of middle to 
upper income families.  Zoning regulations can pertain to business, residential, and 
environmental restrictions, to name a few.  Through certain mechanisms such as market 
dynamics and salience in neighborhood choice dynamics these types of political and 
administrative boundaries may foster residential segregation.  This study will analyze the 
existence and strength of its relationship to residential segregation.  
This thesis draws on data from the U.S. Census 2000 to perform regression 
analyses that utilize measures of uneven distribution – for example – the dissimilarity 
index, as the dependent variable.  The dissimilarity index is a familiar and widely used 
measure for summarizing the comparison of how two groups are dispersed over the areas 
of a city.  Like other measures of uneven distribution, the dissimilarity index evaluates 
the comparison in relation to the standard of even distribution.  The dissimilarity index 
represents “the proportion of minority members that would need to change their 
residence to achieve an even distribution” (Massey and Denton 1988:284; Iceland et al. 
2002).  In addition, to assure that my findings regarding the relationship between 
political fragmentation and segregation are robust to the choice of specific measures, I 
also will perform analyses using other alternative measures of segregation including the 
Gini index (G), the entropy index (H), and the correlation ratio (V). 
I consider several different operational definitions in order to capture the amount 
of political fragmentation within the area.  Several variations are definitions used in 
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previous research.  A key, and most commonly used, measure of fragmentation in 
previous research is the total amount of cities with a minimum of 10,000 residents per 1 
million Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) residents.  Other measures of 
fragmentation include total number of cities per 1 million MSA residents, total number 
of cities with a minimum 2,500 residents per 1 million MSA residents, the share of the 
MSA population that is residing outside of the largest city, the share of the MSA 
population residing within cities, and the Gini concentration ratio (G).  In addition, 
control variables that have been used in previous research will be included in selected 
regression analyses in order to ascertain the strength of the statistical model’s key 
independent variable on dissimilarity in the face of competing explanations for variation 
in residential segregation.  The control variables include: the percentage of housing units 
that were built after the Fair Housing Act in 1968; the percentage of housing units vacant 
in the MSA; the percentage of the total labor force that is in the armed forces; the 
percentage of the population that identifies as white; the log of the total population; and 
the age of the MSA. 
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CHAPTER II  
BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
In this section, I briefly mention selected points from the broader literature on 
residential segregation, and provide a brief historical overview of residential segregation.  
The historical analysis will include a focus on the importance of black-white 
segregation, as well as focus on studies analyzing the development of segregated 
neighborhoods and communities pre-Fair Housing Act.  I also consider studies analyzing 
the trend of residential segregation post-Fair Housing Act to identify additional factors 
that are potentially relevant as control variables.  Finally, I provide a brief discussion 
reviewing the potential role of political fragmentation, zoning laws, and related factors 
may have for segregation patterns. 
Importance of Segregation 
Metropolitan areas of the United States are characterized by high levels of racial 
segregation; it is the norm, not the exception.  What are the consequences?  Massey and 
Denton (1993:2) state that “residential segregation is not a neutral fact; it systematically 
undermines the social and economic well-being of (minorities) in the United States.”  
What occurs as a result of residential segregation is that minorities and people of color 
are subjected to continued conditions of poverty, joblessness, and welfare being the 
norm.  The educational system is lackluster resulting in high educational failure rates 
(Kozol 2005; Massey and Denton 1993).  Urban poverty and the development of an 
urban underclass result from higher levels of segregation (Massey and Denton 1993).  
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Continued exposure to these types of environments decreases the chances that 
disadvantaged racially segregated groups will achieve social and economic success.  The 
following section reviews research documenting that segregation is extensive, high in 
magnitude, and enduring. 
History of Residential Segregation 
Residential segregation has a deep rooted history in the U.S.  Massey and Denton 
(1988:282) identify residential segregation as “the degree to which two or more groups 
live separately from one another, in different parts of urban environment.”  In another 
sense, it is “the lack of social contact between status groups due to structured 
opportunities and spatial mismatch” (Berry 2008:204).  The deep rooted history refers to 
the fact that segregated neighborhoods were well established prior to the Fair Housing 
Act and largely was a result of social economic practices (Hershberg, Burstein, Ericksen, 
Greenberg, and Yancey 1979; Massey and Denton 1993; Lieberson 1981).  Although 
residential segregation has come in several forms, the focus of the history section will be 
on white-black segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas. 
1850-1899 – Modes of segregation 
Residential segregation of ethnic groups in U.S. urban areas emerged over many 
decades.  In major industrial cities that were migrant destinations, public transportation 
(horse-pulled trolley) was affordable only to the wealthy elite which were, more often 
than not, whites (Hershberg et al. 1979:63).  During this time, blacks and other 
immigrants, and migrants, tended to concentrate their residential locations in the city 
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core in part to ensure walking access to manufacturing jobs and other employment 
opportunities concentrated near city centers (Hershberg et al. 1979:64).  Between 1860 
and 1899, cities became hubs and refuges for a number of newly arriving blacks and 
immigrants seeking better opportunities than those they encountered in the South and 
rural areas, for blacks, and abroad for immigrants (Massey and Denton 1993:18).   
Massey and Denton (1993:19-20) note that the development of racially 
segregated neighborhoods in the late 19th century initially was not the result of housing 
discrimination, but was tied more closely to discrimination in employment.  The high-
skill and high-wage employment opportunities were reserved for whites which, thus led 
to the limited capacity for housing affordability in people of color.  As Hershberg et al. 
(1979:64) state, “industry was more important than ethnicity in organizing the city’s 
residential patterns.”  Hershberg et al (1979:25-29) argue that the residential segregation 
of blacks has not followed similar patterns as white immigrants from Europe such as 
Italians, Polish, and Irish.  White immigrants groups already present in metropolitan 
cores reached mild levels of segregation in comparison to the segregation of blacks 
(Hershberg et al 1979).  In the following time periods it became evident that the 
residential segregation of blacks was on the path to become a greater social issue than 
that of previously arriving immigrant groups, which began to fade in importance 
(Hershberg et al 1979). 
1900-1939 – Emerging discrimination and formation of ghettos 
Beginning in 1900, “the era of integrated living” and “interracial contact” was 
gone because of the “industrialization of America and the concomitant movement of 
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blacks from farms to cities” (Massey and Denton 1993:26).  Industrialization in the 
North created “social, economic, and technological changes” that promoted segregation 
while there was a continued “stream” of black migrants (Massey and Denton 1993:26-
27).  Between 1900 and 1920, whites became “increasingly intolerant of black 
neighbors” and saw racial integration as an “invasion” spreading into and across their 
neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1993:30).  This coincided much with the occurrence 
of the “Great Migration”, which was movement of blacks in large numbers from the 
South to urban areas in the North (Lieberson 1981; Tolnay 2003; Grossman 1989).  Not 
only did the population of blacks in the North begin to increase, but so did the level of 
their segregation from whites which led to the early formation of ghettos.  
“Conservation” efforts arise when the “racial reserves” of groups are perceived to be 
“invaded” thus attempting to maintain the social order (Park 1924:344).  By the 1930s, 
blacks were highly concentrated in industrial urban centers yet were employed 
minimally in manufacturing jobs (Hershberg, Burstein, Ericksen, Greenberg, and 
Yancey 1979:72).  Beginning in the 1930s, the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation 
(HOLC) had “institutionalized” a practice known as “redlining” (Massey and Denton 
1993:51-52).  Redlining was a discriminatory practice that restricted housing loans to 
white neighborhoods while the neighborhoods that were classified as black or ethnically 
mixed were “redlined” and denied loan opportunities (Massey and Denton 1993:51-55).  
Redlining institutionalized local discriminatory covenants at the federal level to satisfy 
the HOLC’s concern of black movement (Massey and Denton 1993:52).  Residential 
segregation as we know it today emerged during the 1930’s decade.  Hershberg et al. 
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(1979) notes that in Philadelphia the population of blacks rose from 4.8 percent, in the 
year 1900, to 11.3 percent, in the year 1930, while their dissimilarity index went from 
52, in 1880, to 68, in 1940. 
1940-1967 – Stability and consolidation of the ghetto 
Industrialization, in the North, combined with mechanization of agriculture and 
reduced demand for agricultural labor in the early 20th century created a strong migration 
of blacks from farms and rural areas to cities, thus increasing the amount of segregated 
neighborhoods.  In this transition era, “ghettos” on a much larger scale began to form in 
American urban areas.  Between the 1940s and 50s, Duncan and Duncan (1955b:502) 
found “that spatial distances between occupation groups are closely related to their 
social distances.”  In the 1940s, the U.S. entered into World War II, which brought 
housing construction to a stop.  This event fixed the availability of housing supply, 
overall, which further restricted black migrants to the “urban environment” (Massey and 
Denton 1993:43).  Blacks, who in an earlier era had been able to move into more 
affluent, predominantly white, neighborhoods if they had the economic means to do so, 
were now restricted to the lower class neighborhoods consisting mostly of blacks.  
Segregated communities continued to grow as a confluence of many different social 
forces ranging from “institutional practices, private behaviors, and public policies 
designed by whites” to restrict the movement of blacks and people of color (Massey and 
Denton 1993:10).  It was during this time that protests and violence erupted in 
communities across the U.S.  During the 1960s, urban unrest punctuated by episodes of 
violent social upheaval stemming from employment and educational disadvantages 
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occurred in black neighborhoods in sixty cities across the U.S. (Massey and Denton 
1993:58).  The protests and violence were a result of built up frustration in segregated 
neighborhoods and with white institutions often the target of the disruption (Massey and 
Denton 1993:58-59). 
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CHAPTER III  
GRADUAL AND RESISTANT DECLINE IN  
SEGREGATION - 1968 - PRESENT 
In this section, I discuss factors that have played a role in shaping segregation 
over time.  Looking back it is clear that segregation did not decline quickly in the short 
run after the FHA, and has fallen only slowly over the following four decades (Massey 
and Denton 1993; Glaeser and Vigdor 2001).  By the time of the Civil Rights Era and 
the passage of the Fair Housing Act, communities were highly segregated but saw hope 
in the passage of anti-discriminatory regulation.  Many in the lay public assumed that 
“following the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968, the problem of housing 
discrimination was declared solved” as the focus for Civil Rights leaders, politicians, 
and academicians now turned to employment, educational policies, familial structure, 
institutional racism, and the federal welfare system (Massey and Denton 1993:4).  
Despite the popular belief, and as a result of the lack of attention, segregation persisted 
at high levels long after the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 1968.  This raises 
questions about the factors that play a role in shaping trends in segregation, and how the 
roles of different factors have changed or have not changed over time. 
Role of Formal and Informal Discrimination to Block Minority Movement 
In the post-Civil Rights Era, each segregated community responded differently to 
social change in that they relied heavily on local social processes which may have 
hindered or allowed dispersion.  Post-Fair Housing Act, Silver (1995:61) notes that 
“even though (segregated communities) had access to the same” Federal urban 
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development funding “the local political culture (directly) affected the allocation of these 
resources in Black community development.”  The FHA was legislation that prohibited 
racial discrimination in the housing market but without mechanisms to enforce its 
provisions on those causing discrimination (Massey and Denton 1993:195).  
Discriminatory practices at the local level, informal and formal, could be questioned by 
the Federal government but never actually regulated (Massey and Denton 1993:195-
196). 
Forces that promote segregation have become less overt and more covert in 
recent decades.  A segregation process known as “steering” is an example of a covert 
practice used by the real estate industry (Turner, Ross, Galster, Yinger, Godfrey, 
Bednarz, Herbig, Lee, Hossain, and Zhao 2002).  In an audit conducted by the Housing 
and Urban Development Administration (HUD), Turner et al. (2002) found that 
discriminatory practices were in fact pervasive in the real estate industry, more 
specifically through the actions of the realtor.  Realtors were found to steer potential 
buyers to certain neighborhoods based on their race or ethnicity.  In addition, potential 
buyers, who were people of color, were least likely to be told about financial 
opportunities in purchasing a home than their white counterparts.  Massey and Denton 
(1993:96-98) describe this as “discrimination with a smile.”  Black homeseekers, 
“instead of being greeted with the derisive rejection”, were “met by a realtor with a 
smiling face who, through a series of ruses, lies, and deceptions, makes it hard for them 
to learn about, inspect, rent, or purchase homes in white neighborhoods” (Massey and 
Denton 1993:97). 
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Homeowner Associations (HOA) existed well before the FHA but saw a rapid 
increase in numbers post-FHA (Stabile 2000; Davis 2006).  Davis (2006:244-246) notes 
that homeowner associations were successful in arguing against low-income and senior 
housing.  In addition, HOAs played a role in the shaping of communities of cities largely 
resulting in the separation of affluent and middle-class neighborhoods from the poor and 
minority populations (Davis 2006: 244-246).  HOAs were sanctioned, and even 
encouraged, by the Fair Housing Administration as a tool that could bridge the gap 
between low and high income housing (Stabile 2000:105).  Rather, HOAs were used to 
draw a clearer line of separation between communities (Davis 2006). 
Role of Economic Inequality and Market Forces 
During the 1970s, segregated communities “changed so little” (Massey and 
Denton 1993:84).  Massey and Denton (1993:84) state that a few years after the passage 
of the Fair Housing Act 1968 minorities’ “economic progress stalled” which “increased 
poverty as a result of income inequality.”  Segregation levels between blacks and whites 
had shown improvement in previous decades that the stall became highly noticeable.  
Massey and Denton (1993:84) note that “if the economic progress of the 1950s and 
1960s had been sustained into the 1970s, segregation levels might have fallen more 
significantly” and blacks would have had a greater economic opportunity to move into 
neighborhoods that only whites could previously afford. 
“Successive recessions, bursts of inflation, and increased foreign competition 
eliminated many high-paying jobs in manufacturing, lowered wages, and decreased the 
real value of welfare payments,” all of which disproportionately affected the income of 
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blacks (Massey and Denton 1993:125).  Massey and Denton (1993:184) also argue that 
inner-city manufacturing jobs were dislocated at greater rates because of lack of 
investment and relocation to non-metropolitan areas which drove up the rate of black 
poverty.  Massey and Denton (1993:126) find that this turn of economic events 
generated an increase in the “geographic concentration” of poverty stricken blacks.  
Blacks in poverty were pressured into a more a spatially concentrated area of other poor 
blacks.  Massey and Denton (1993:130-131) stress that the poverty of blacks is not a 
neutral social factor rather, it goes hand in hand with “family instability, welfare 
dependency, crime, housing abandonment, and low educational achievement.”  These 
social factors coupled with existing segregated communities “guarantees that blacks will 
face a harsh and uniquely disadvantaged social environment, no matter what their 
personal characteristics” (Massey and Denton 1993:131). 
Communities have also been deemed to be class and income segregated.  Massey 
and Denton (1993:145-146) note that racial income disparities between blacks and 
whites perpetuated segregated communities.  During the 1970s, black-white segregation 
had little change which alluded to racial segregation because blacks whose incomes and 
education increased tended to remain in highly segregated black communities (Massey 
and Denton 1993:145).  If a black household could afford to move into a neighborhood 
previously afforded only to whites they were still likely to remain segregated.  Massey 
and Denton (1993:84-87) note that residential segregation is a matter of race rather than 
class because detailed analysis of segregation patterns show that as the economic status 
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of minority households increase the likelihood of residing in a segregated neighborhood 
largely remains the same. 
Role of Preferences and Household Residential Location Decisions 
Group differences in residential preferences regarding contact with the same or 
other groups, based off prejudices, are sometimes hypothesized to play a role in 
residential segregation.  Blacks tend to be more accepting of racially mixed 
neighborhoods but often still prefer to avoid areas with limited black presence for fear of 
retribution or discrimination by whites.  Whites are more accepting of minimally 
desegregated neighborhoods with limited black presence yet remain uncomfortable with 
significant numbers of blacks moving into their neighborhood or themselves locating in 
majority black neighborhoods because of negative black stereotypes (Massey and 
Denton 1993).  The attitudes among different group’s leads to a disparity in the demand 
for racially mixed communities.   
Robert Park (1924:343) notes that the prejudices between groups were a 
“spontaneous disposition to maintain social distances.”  These social processes fall in 
line with the notion that the greater presence of black residents in a community leads to 
White flight (Massey and Denton 1993).  Clark (1986) notes in his study that once a 
neighborhood reaches a 50 percent black composition the majority of whites prefer to 
relocate.  Other studies have found different “tipping” points than those of the racial 
attitude composition.  Ellen (2000:124) found the probability of a white homeowner 
relocating increases 2.75 percentage points, on average, when “the black population has 
grown by ten percentage points over the decade.”  As Ellen (2000:109) states these 
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attitudes are “hypothetical” and “only reflect how households believe they would react 
rather than how they would actually react.”  Preferences vary largely on different 
characteristics of homeowners; for example, whether they have children, whether they 
have a vested interest in the quality of their community, and whether they have the 
socioeconomic ability to move (Ellen 2000:124-130).  Ellen (2000) notes that white 
flight is a social phenomenon that has helped shape segregated communities today but 
the preferences of neighborhood characteristics play a larger role in shaping the entry 
decisions of homeseekers. 
Researchers have found other types of preferences that shape neighborhood 
composition (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999).  Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) 
found that racial residential segregation can be related to the amount and type of public 
goods and services offered in the community.  Racial and ethnic minorities display a 
preference to move to locations where spending is greater in healthcare, welfare, 
education, etc. (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999:1260-1263). 
Since the 1970s, segregation continues to decline but, as discussed above, it 
continues to be both high and persistent.  Glaeser and Vigdor (2001) find that 
segregation in the U.S. today is at its lowest point since the 1920s.  Researchers (Glaeser 
and Vigdor 2001:4) note that, although levels of segregation are at their lowest point 
since the 1920s, this should not obscure the “existence of very segregated metropolitan 
areas.”  In addition, Glaeser and Vigdor (2001:5) note that regions within the U.S. 
continue their respective segregation history with the West and South being more 
integrated and the Northeast and Midwest remaining highly segregated.  This leads one 
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to examine other social and political factors that may play a role in the maintenance of 
segregated communities in metropolitan areas. 
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CHAPTER IV  
THE ROLE OF POLITICAL DIVISIONS AND  
FRAGMENTATION IN URBAN SPACE 
Political fragmentation is defined as “the autonomous regulatory authority that 
every locality (jurisdiction) has over land use and land development decisions” (Byun 
and Esparza 2005;253).  It is a “proliferation of autonomous jurisdictions” (Bischoff 
2008:182).  Researchers describe political fragmentation as a ubiquitous “fact” in 
contemporary urban America (Baird and Landon 1972:171).  In this section, I introduce 
political fragmentation and its relation to residential segregation.  A discussion of the 
role of political fragmentation in urban space will follow.  It is important to note that 
political fragmentation and zoning may be a new phenomenon relative to the 
development of segregated communities.  Zoning regulations were legally established in 
1920 through the Zoning Enabling Act (Rothwell and Massey 2010:1131).  In addition, 
political fragment and zoning regulatory boundaries may have been drawn post - 
segregation to reflect this residential separation (Rothwell and Massey 2010:1131).   
Political fragmentation may occur in many ways, but in this study, it will be 
referring to populated “places”.  These populated places will be looked at how densely 
they have been drawn and not where they have been drawn.  It is also important to note 
that political fragmentation will not be alluding to political entities such as congressional 
districts.  This is not to suppose that congressional districts are not political fragments or 
that they have no relationship to residential segregation, rather it is that considering this 
and other potentially relevant types of fragmentation is beyond the scope of this study.  
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A discussion on the relationship that zoning regulations have within political fragments 
and the effects the regulations have on residential segregation will follow. 
Role of Political Fragmentation 
Weiher (1991) argues that political and administrative jurisdictions, otherwise 
known as fragments, can play an important role in supporting and maintaining patterns 
of residential segregation. Weiher (1991:166) states that “political boundaries support 
the recruitment that is the complement to exclusion in urban sorting.”  Morgan and 
Mareschal (1999:579) argue that, while although it may remain in dispute, political 
fragmentation contributes to the current inner-city problems the U.S. endures today.  
These inner-city problems include residential segregation and such social phenomenon is 
the precise result created by those who dominate the social process, the most powerful 
(Morgan and Mareschal 1999:579).  Bischoff (2008) states that political fragmentation 
may be needed to regulate certain social processes within a community, in that local 
neighborhoods require specialized monitoring for social services, but the racial 
stratification outcome is harmful to the communities. 
Morgan and Mareschal (1999:589) found that a single suburb increase (per 
1,000,000 people), on average, leads to a 2.01 unit increase (0-100 scale) in black racial 
isolation meaning as the amount of suburbs increase so does the likelihood of blacks 
only coming in contact with blacks.  These outcomes could be unintended consequences 
resulting from the pursuit of other goals, or they could be desired consequences pursued 
by covert means.  Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004:391) find that increases in white 
ethnic heterogeneity increases the number of municipalities within jurisdictions.  Alesina 
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et al (2004:394) also find that residents who can afford it will avoid large population 
municipalities because of their demand of social goods and resources.  The avoidance 
generates smaller municipalities with racially homogenous populations.   
Baird and Landon (1972) note that municipalities that have larger populations are 
seen as unappealing to some population groups because of their demand for public 
resource output is smaller, making less densely settled, population fragments an 
attractive choice.  This rests on the assumption that greater public goods output is closely 
associated with higher taxes but research indicates that the relationship is 
inconsequential (Baird and Landon 1972:180-182).  Ultimately, residents seek out areas 
with many municipalities with the conception that the local jurisdiction will ensure tax 
expenditures are spent on social goods that directly affect those within (Baird and 
Landon 1972:175-176). 
The Effects of Zoning 
Zoning regulations, by definition, are “the separation of land use according to 
each area’s impact and neighborhood relevance” (Maltz 2006:49).  Some research has 
found that the phenomenon of restrictive zoning and multiple political fragments go 
hand-in-hand (Burgess 1996; Weiher 1991; Orfield 1999).  As communities develop on 
the edges of the metropolitan they aim to enact low-density and restrictive zoning 
regulations in an effort to keep outer ring neighborhood composition “as is” and to 
prevent the urban population from moving in (Orfield 1999:34-36; Bassett 1936).  
Researchers (Byun and Esparza 2005; Frieden 1979; Plotkin 1987:30) find that 
supporting arguments for zoning laws usually come in the form of the protection of 
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environmental quality, maintenance of property values, and the stabilization of local 
taxes to name a few. 
Officials within political fragments of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) have 
the ability to enact these types of land use regulations (zoning) whether they are intended 
for businesses, residential, agricultural, etc.  Weiher (1991:87 & 162) notes that we are 
unable to fully know the intentions of elected officials but certain zoning policies 
produce spatial consequences for disadvantaged social groups and, ultimately, provide 
whites with “altered and institutional forms” of averting blacks.  Zoning takes the “good 
fences make good neighbors” idea to the next level by protecting the boundaries and 
quality of life for residents within (Plotkin 1987:20).  Enacted zoning laws do not state 
“minorities are not welcome” or “Keep Out!” but nevertheless may marginalize groups 
in society through legal regulation (Plotkin 1987:20-21, Popper 1981:11; Silver 1997).   
Plotkin (1987:23) argues that zoning regulations utilize exclusionary practices 
which “raise charges by limiting housing supplies, encouraging land speculation, 
monopolizing public services, and leapfrogging away from preexisting utilities, thus 
forcing the construction of expensive new facilities and wasting land.”  Burgess 
(1996:213-214), a researcher in housing and residential development, notes that, in 
practice and implementation, zoning is a method to protect wealthy areas while 
neglecting the low-income areas.  In some situations, zoning policies in low-income 
areas were ineffective in defending the interests of the residents in these areas from 
actions by local government boards when development worked in the favor of those 
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serving on the board and against the residents of low-income areas (Burgess 1996:214; 
Bassett 1936).   
Today local governments within political fragments enact zoning laws and 
regulations affecting population density, large-minimum lot, and land use to name a few 
examples.  Publicly stated justifications for these types of zoning and related land use 
regulations do not specify a goal racial segregation.  What is stated may or may not be 
the only motivation for the proposal and adoption of the regulations or the support they 
receive.  The effects of political fragmentation and zoning regulations extend beyond 
regulating and protecting the quality of life for those within the boundary.  Although 
zoning is a legal regulation enacted within political fragments to protect the quality of 
life within for residents it results in the maintenance of residential segregation.  These 
types of social policies, in the form of building regulations and political boundaries, 
along with other social factors have continued to foster group separation thus leading to 
inadequate access of social resources. 
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CHAPTER V  
DATA, MEASURES, AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
 The following section will cover this thesis’ source of data as well as go into 
detail on the adopted methods of analysis to measure political fragmentation and its 
relationship to residential segregation. 
Source of Data 
This research utilized data from Census 2000 Summary File 1 data to examine 
the effects of political fragmentation on black-white residential segregation.  Summary 
File 1 tabulations are based on the U.S. decennial census and are widely used in 
segregation research.  They are based on the 100%, or “complete coverage”, counts of 
the Census, and provide the most comprehensive data on racial residential distributions.  
The U.S. Census 2000 is being utilized because the most current 2010 data had not been 
released at the time of the study. 
Units of Analysis, Sampling, and Sample Restriction 
The U.S. Census 2000 data set yields 331 units of metropolitan statistical areas 
(MSAs).  MSAs contain a place with a minimum 50,000 population or at least one 
Census defined Urban Area with a total Metropolitan Area population of 100,000 (U.S. 
Census Geographic Definitions).  Metropolitan statistical areas are defined by their 
principle or central city which does not extend beyond the MSA boundary.  In some 
cases, an MSA may contain two or more central cities, central counties, as well as one or 
more outlying counties (U.S. Census Definitions; Farrell 2008:475). 
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MSAs have been used widely in previous studies analyzing residential 
segregation (Farley 1977; Iceland et al 2002; Farrell 2008).  Metropolitan statistical 
areas have been determined to be an ideal geographical candidate for being 
representative of communities within (Iceland et al 2002).  Iceland et al (2002:7) note 
that geographies larger than MSAs span greater populations that may not be 
representative of the local community, while geographies smaller than MSAs cannot 
capture the spatial distribution of a community since “individuals need only move across 
the street to be in another jurisdiction.”   
I will examine MSAs with a minimum of 50,000 total households and a 
minimum 2,500 black households.  This restriction brings the total amount of MSAs in 
the study to 205.  The restriction stems from the dissimilarity index requiring that there 
be a minimum population present for both groups to help obtain trustworthy scores.  
Researchers have set minimum requirements at 1,000, 2,500, and 5,000 with the higher 
the amounts being a “safer” approach to measuring dissimilarity with less uncertainty 
(Eitle 2009; Glaeser and Vigdor 2001; Logan, Stultz, and Farley 2004; Massey and 
Denton 1992; Massey and Fischer 1999; Hill 1974).  Researchers note that when a 
minority population becomes too low relative to the number of census tracts in the MSA 
the dissimilarity index can become biased, inflated, and unreliable (Denton and Massey 
1988:804; Winship 1977:1059).  Winship (1977:1062) notes that the D index for “two 
cities with 25 households per block”, with one city being 10 percent black and the other 
50 percent black, the dissimilarity index would be .272 and .161, respectively.  Both 
cities have identical segregation patterns but because one city has a smaller black 
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population a greater proportion of their households would need to move to achieve 
desegregation. 
The spatial unit used to measure segregation is the census tract which comprises 
between 1,500 and 8,000 inhabitants and averages about 4,000 inhabitants (U.S. Census 
Geographic Definitions; Iceland and Wilkes 2006).  Census tracts take shape from “local 
input” and “are intended to represent neighborhoods (Iceland and Steinmetz 2003; 
Iceland et al 2002:8).  Census tracts will be used in this study for several reasons: to 
maintain consistency with most previous research on segregation (Glaeser and Vigdor 
2001:2); to minimize the issue of handling geographic units with little to no population 
such as blocks and block groups (Iceland et al 2002:8); to obtain a reasonably accepted 
neighborhood size and composition for research (Farrell 2008:476); statistical adequacy 
for capturing segregation patterns in most U.S. cities; and because tracts are created for 
the purpose of capturing meaningful social areas (U.S. Census Geographic Definitions).  
Census tracts are useful for present research purposes because of their conceptual and 
statistical properties.  Census tracts are homogenous representations of population 
characteristics, and thus provide accurate tabulations on relevant race and ethnic 
composition and group counts such as non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, 
Hispanic or Latino, Asian, etc. 
Population of Interest 
 The U.S. Census Bureau gathers detailed information on the racial and ethnic 
identities of the U.S. population.  For the purpose of this study, tabulations on non-
Hispanic whites and non-Hispanic blacks are of particular focus.  The U.S. Census (SF1 
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Technical Documentation 2000:B-12) classifies non-Hispanic whites as persons having 
“origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa.”  
Non-Hispanic blacks are persons “having origins in any of the black racial groups of 
Africa (SF1 Technical Documentation 2000:B-12).  It is important to criterion race 
because Hispanics and Latinos can identify as any race and may be subject to different 
residential dynamics and distributions. 
Segregation Measures 
Data for the dependent variables was gathered from U.S. Census Population and 
Housing report (U.S. Census Housing Patterns 2000) which contained multiple indices 
pertaining to U.S. segregation patterns.  Using Non-Hispanic whites as a reference, 
segregation scores were calculated for each race and ethnic group in the U.S.  This study 
used several measures including the dissimilarity, Gini, entropy, and Theil index scores, 
for blacks, calculated by the Census at the tract level.  The indices are discussed in 
further detail below. 
Strategies of Data Analysis 
Bivariate ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is used for the initial 
analysis of the effect of political fragmentation on residential segregation.  An OLS 
regression analysis was chosen to assess the kind of relationship political fragmentation 
has on residential segregation as well to assess the strength and direction of the effects of 
the independent variable and control variables.  Following the bivariate analysis, 
multiple regression analyses will be conducted to assess the impact of the independent 
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variable and control variables, as defined in the literature, which may have an effect on 
residential segregation.  These regression models will be utilized as an effort to ascertain 
the strength of the variables with the inclusion and exclusion of particular control 
variables that relate to the social and economic conditions of the MSA. 
Measures 
 For the purpose of this study multiple dependent and independent variables will 
be utilized, as well as several control variables, while paying attention to specified key 
variables.  The key variables will be identified as the most commonly used and widely 
accepted variables in previous research literature. In addition, a systematic dataset on 
zoning ordinances in metropolitan areas is non-existent.  Zoning may be considered a 
surrogate of political fragmentation although in this study it is being treated 
independently from political fragmentation. Measurements of zoning and other land use 
ordinances will hopefully be applied in future research. 
Dependent variable 
A key dependent variable for the thesis will be the index of dissimilarity (D). 
 
  
 
 D is a segregation measure that displays the amount of dissimilarity between 
whites and blacks based on a single point on the curve or “the maximum vertical 
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distance between the Lorenz curve and the diagonal line of evenness” (Massey and 
Denton 1988:284).  The Lorenz curve “plots the cumulative proportion of (minority 
members) against the cumulative proportion of (majority members) across aerial units, 
ordered from smallest to largest minority proportions” (Massey and Denton 1988:284).   
The dissimilarity index “captures the degree to which blacks and whites are 
evenly spread among neighborhoods in a city” (Massey and Denton 1993:20).  D varies 
between 0 and 1, with 0 being complete integration, while 1 represents complete 
segregation.  It is popular in part because it has an appealing interpretation; its numeric 
value indicates the minimum proportion of one group that would have to change 
neighborhoods to bring about an even distribution (Massey and Denton 1988:284; 
Iceland et al. 2002:8; Fossett 2008:2; White 1986:202-203).  Today, D is the most 
commonly used and accepted measure of segregation (Massey and Denton 1988).  In 
this study, D has a mean of 49.96, standard deviation of 14, and a minimum of 18.8 
(Bismarck, ND MSA) and a maximum of 84.6 (Detroit, MI MSA).   
 For comparative purposes I will also analyze other segregation indices.  The 
second dependent variable is a segregation measure of evenness known as the Gini index 
(G).   
  
 
 The Gini index uses a different approach at measuring segregation but, like the 
index of dissimilarity, varies on a scale from 0 to 1.0 (M = 64.23 SD = 15.22).  The Gini 
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index is expressed as a proportion which “represents the area between the Lorenz curve 
and the diagonal of evenness” (Massey and Denton 1988:285; Duncan and Duncan 
1955a).  G represents the full shape of the segregation curve as opposed to D’s single 
point on the curve making it “sensitive to all transfers of minority and majority members 
between areas” (Massey and Denton 1988:285).  In this study, G has a mean of 64.23, a 
standard deviation of 15.22, and a minimum of 25.6 (Missoula, MT MSA) and a 
maximum of 94.4 (Gary, IN MSA). 
A third dependent variable is an evenness measure known as the entropy index 
(H), or Theil index.   
 
  
 
 The entropy index, sometimes known as the information index, also varies on a 
scale from 0 to 1.0, and measures a departure from evenness by assessing each unit’s 
departure from the racial, or ethnic entropy of the whole city, or the extent of its two 
groups reaching a maximum 50/50 diversity (Massey and Denton 1988).  The entropy 
index has a mean of 25.28, a standard deviation of 14.90, and a minimum of 1.6 
(Missoula, MT MSA) and a maximum of 69.8 (Gary, IN MSA). 
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A fourth dependent variable is a segregation measure of evenness known as the 
correlation ratio (V).   
   
 
 The correlation ratio measures the extent to which minorities, group one, are 
exposed to majority members, group two.  It is measured on a scale of 0 to 1.0 and has 
multiple interpretations (Stearns and Logan 1986a; Massey and Denton 1988).  Stearns 
and Logan (1986a:127) note that the correlation ratio “measures the difference in racial 
composition of various neighborhoods.”  The correlation ratio is the “variance in racial 
composition between neighborhoods to the total variance in racial composition,” thus 
representing an indication of the extent to which neighborhoods are “polarizing” 
between all-white and all-black (Stearns and Logan 1986a:127-128).  The correlation 
ratio has a mean of 23.46, a standard deviation of 18, and a minimum of .1 (Missoula, 
MT MTA) and a maximum of 75 (Detroit, MI MSA). 
 Several measures of segregation are incorporated to increase the level of 
confidence by determining if findings are consistent across alternative measures.  The 
measures of segregation are commonly used and accepted measures of unevenness. 
Independent variable 
Currently, data available to measure political fragmentation is limited.  The 
measurement of fragmentation is operationalized relying greatly on the type of data that 
is available, as well as what type of fragmentation researchers are aiming to analyze.  
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This study follows previous research by analyzing fragmentation using Census-
designated-places (CDP).  CDPs are cities within an MSA.  CDPs are developed by the 
Census Bureau for statistical purposes to identify locations by name, but their boundaries 
are not necessarily identical to those recognized by the State.  MSAs with greater 
amounts of CDPs are thought to have greater fragmentation.  The CDPs range in size 
from a zero populated area to 3.7 million populated area. 
Political fragmentation has been operationalized in several ways utilizing CDP’s 
(Hawkins and Dye 1970).  Six alternative measurements will be used in this study.  Each 
has a distinct substantive interpretation.  Using multiple measures allows for checking 
consistency of results. 
The first independent variable measuring political fragmentation is the total 
number of cities per 1 million MSA residents.  This operationalization of the CDPs is 
commonly used in previous research to capture political fragmentation.  This particular 
measure of fragmentation takes into account all incorporated places recognized by the 
Census, regardless of the size of their population.  In this case, CDPs that had a zero 
population were included in the measurement.  CDPs with a zero population are not 
ideal for fragmentation and segregation measurement but are included in the analysis as 
an alternative.  The total number of cities per 1 million MSA residents has a mean of 
78.77, a 51.32 standard deviation, and a minimum of 3.84 (Anchorage, AK MSA) and 
amaximum of 296.62 (Johnstown, PA MSA). 
The second independent variable measuring political fragmentation is the total 
number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA residents.  This, a 
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slightly different variation than the previous measure of fragmentation, is also used in 
previous research studies analyzing political fragmentation.  This operationalization of 
the CDPs takes into account all incorporated places recognized by the Census, as long as 
they contain a minimum population of 2,500.  CDPs with a population smaller than 
2,500 are more fruitful for political fragmentation measurement, than the previous 
measure, but are not meaningful for segregation research.  These CDPs are not ideal as a 
measure of fragmentation because their populations are miniscule to non-existent, to 
foster segregation between groups.  The total number of cities with a minimum of 2,500 
population per 1 million MSA residents has a mean of 32.81, a 14.89 standard deviation, 
and a minimum of 3.84 (Anchorage, AK MSA) and maximum of 86.12 (Barnstable-
Yarmouth, MA MSA). 
The third, and key, independent variable measuring political fragmentation, the 
most commonly used method in previous research studies, is the total amount of cities 
with a minimum of 10,000 residents per 1 million MSA residents (Bischoff 2008:193; 
Morgan and Mareschal 1999).  According to researchers, this definition of political 
fragmentation is an attractive measure of decentralization and “assumes that more 
political units afford greater opportunities for separation and escape,” which leads to a 
greater amount of central-city and urban problems (Morgan and Mareschal 1999:585, 
Weiher 1991).  This operationalization allows researchers to account for special districts, 
which, while not directly measured, are more likely to occur in cities with a minimum 
10,000 population (Morgan and Mareschal 1999:585).  Special districts may include 
school districts, water districts, sewage districts, fire protection districts all of which 
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affect city growth and the ability for residents to relocate (Carruthers 2003; Morgan and 
Mareschal 1999).  The total amount of cities with a minimum 10,000 residents per 1 
million MSA residents has a mean of 13.02, a standard deviation of 5.81, and a 
minimum of 2.68 (Reading, PA MSA) and maximum of 35.93 (Yuba City, CA MSA). 
The fourth fragmentation measure is the MSA population share residing outside 
of the largest city.  This measure of fragmentation captures the share of the population 
that is residing outside of the largest recognized CDP.  The MSA population share 
residing outside of the largest city has a mean of 64.22, a standard deviation of 19.02, 
and a minimum of 0 (Anchorage, AK MSA) and a maximum of 97.95 (Nassau-Suffolk, 
NY MSA).   
The fifth fragmentation measure is the MSA population residing within cities.  
This particular measure captures the degree to which the total population resides within 
all CDP’s against those who reside in places not recognized by the Census.  The MSA 
population residing within cities has a mean of 71.87, a standard deviation of 15.53, and 
a minimum of 22.8 (Ocala, FL MSA) and a maximum of 100 (Anchorage, AK MSA).  
 The sixth, and final, fragmentation measure is the Gini concentration ratio (G), 
also known as the Gini ratio.  The Gini ratio is measured on a scale of 0 to 1.0, which is 
used to describe the distribution of the population across CDPs, with 0 being complete 
even dispersion across areas and 1.0 being complete concentration (McKibben and Faust 
2004:116).  As noted earlier, the Gini index also can be adapted to use as a measure of 
segregation.  But here, the Gini concentration ratio is being applied in a different manner 
and purpose to serve, as a measure of fragmentation (Swanson 2004).  The Gini ratio 
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informs us the degree to which the population is concentrated within metropolitan 
fragments which are Census Designated Places in this study.  For this study, the Gini 
ratio scores of 0 and 100 will equal to low and high fragmentation, respectively.  The 
Gini ratio has a minimum of 8.44 (San Antonio, TX MSA) and a maximum of 100 
(Anchorage, AK MSA). 
As previously mentioned, the varying operationalization of fragmentation allows 
for differing interpretations largely influenced by how Census Designated Places exist 
within in each MSA.  For example, the first fragmentation measure takes into account all 
CDP’s within an MSA, regardless of its population size.  While this measure was used in 
previous research studies it can be criticized for its approach to measuring the degree of 
fragmentation within certain MSAs.  Fragmentation is being measured in terms of how 
places divide the MSA and its population.  The first measure of fragmentation captures 
all of the CDPs which, as some MSAs have shown, can have a zero population, or even 
just extremely small populations.  Using this particular method may distort the 
fragmentation result, since a close to zero, or zero population, in a CDP is not a density.  
Fragments without population cannot directly provide an opportunity for segregation. 
The second fragmentation measure has a slightly different criterion than the first 
by requiring that each CDP contain a minimum population of 2,500.  Again, this 
particular operationalization may distort the fragmentation result with such a small 
population requirement in each CDP.   
The third fragmentation measure, the most commonly used measure of 
fragmentation, sets the CDP criteria to have a minimum of 10,000 population.  This 
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particular measure is quite fruitful in capturing fragmentation because the higher 
population requirement accounts for many types of fragmentation, i.e. special districts, 
as mentioned previously.   
The three previously mentioned fragmentation measures are commonly used but 
the conceptual fragmentation that they are able to capture is limited.  The MSAs all 
contain different variations of CDPs, meaning they differ in number, population size, 
and relative total population size.  For example, in the most commonly used 
fragmentation measure, the total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 
1 million residents, has a maximum score in the Yuba, City, CA MSA.  Yuba City, CA 
MSA has a relatively small total population (139,149) with a large number of CDPs 
(12).  Of the 12 CDPs, five have populations that are greater than 10,000.  Political 
fragmentation in previous research needs to be reflected on in future research such as 
this one because it may or may not prove to be adequate.  Prior operationalizations may 
result in high scores in an MSA with low fragmentation and low scores for an MSA with 
high fragmentation. 
The fourth measure captures the share of the population residing outside of the 
largest city.  This particular measure captures, greatly, how densely drawn the fragments 
are in the MSA.  In this case, Yuba City MSA goes from having the greatest amount of 
fragmentation to a more moderate strength in fragmentation.  Yuba City may be a 
fragmented city, in general, but it may not be as fragmented as the third fragmentation 
measure says it is.  Its fragmentation score in the most commonly used fragmentation 
measure is distorted by its number of number of CDP’s relative to its total population, 
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which is relatively small, as well.  The fifth measure, the share of the population that is 
residing within cities also displays moderate fragmentation for Yuba City.   
The sixth, and final, fragmentation measure takes all CDPs into account and 
generates their relative share to the total population in the MSA.  As previously 
mentioned, Yuba City has a high number of CDPs relative to its small total population.  
The result is a high level of fragmentation for Yuba City, CA MSA.  The discussion of 
Yuba City, CA MSA was to illustrate the necessity of having multiple measures of 
fragmentation.  Yuba City, CA MSA illustrated how the different measures of 
fragmentation capture differing substantive concepts and, in some cases, how CDPs may 
not be capturing fragmentation. 
Control Variables 
 This research study included a number of control variables the previous research 
suggests may impact segregation.  Multiple control variables are needed in an effort to 
determine whether segregation is the result of phenomenon other than political 
fragmentation.  The control variables will include: 
1. Percentage of occupant housing units built after the Fair Housing Act in 1968.  
According to the literature, housing built 1970+ should affect segregation 
outcomes as they are under “new housing rules” (Denton 1999).  Metropolitan 
areas with greater amounts of housing built post-FHA are expected to have lower 
amounts of residential segregation (Denton 1999).  The percentage of housing 
built post-FHA has a mean of 53.19, a standard deviation of 14.74, a minimum of 
19 (New York, NY MSA) and a maximum of 90.18 (Naples, FL MSA). 
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2. Percentage of housing units vacant.  Previous segregation research has found 
that segregation varies with the amount of vacancy (Stearns and Logan 1986b; 
South and Crowder 1998).  A larger surplus of housing has an effect on the cost 
of the homes and those who can afford them in addition to having an effect on 
the ability for residents to relocate in the first place.  Berry (1976) found that 
neighborhood price levels affected the movement of blacks into white and 
integrated neighborhoods.  In addition, Stearns and Logan (1986b) find that a 
higher amount of housing units that are vacant relates to lower amounts of black-
white segregation.  The percent of housing units vacant has a mean of 81.7, a 
standard deviation of 4.51, a minimum of 2.17 (Nashua, NH MSA) and a 
maximum of 35.03 (Barnstable-Yarmouth, MA MSA). 
3. Percentage of the total labor force in the armed forces.  Researchers, such as 
Iceland et al. (2006), have used varying occupational categories when studying 
metropolitan areas.  Farley (1991:281) found that black-white segregation may 
be lower in metropolitan areas that have a sizeable military presence.  Iceland 
and Nelson (2010) also find that greater proportions of military populations in an 
MSA lead to lower segregation scores as a result of the greater likelihood of 
interracial couples.  Percentage of the civilian labor force in the armed forces has 
a mean of 1.31, a standard deviation of 3.74, a minimum of 0.01 (Stamford-
Norwalk, CT MSA) and a maximum of 38.07 (Jacksonville, NC MSA). 
4. Percentage of the population that is white.  Previous literature suggests a large 
population percentage of whites will have an effect on the in-migration of blacks 
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into white communities (South and Crowder 1998; Logan, Stultz and Farley 
2004). Areas with a greater white population are expected to have greater 
amounts of residential segregation.  The percentage of the population that is 
white has a mean of 79.65, a standard deviation of 12.15, a minimum of 21.16 
(Honolulu, HI MSA) and a maximum of 97.5 (Altoona, PA MSA). 
5. Total Population (natural log).  The size of the population within the MSA has 
been found to be positively related to the amount of residential segregation 
(Logan et al. 2004:13).  This research study measures size by the natural log of 
the total population.  The natural log transformation is used to capture non-
linearity in the effect of city size wherein increases in the absolute size (e.g. 
100,000) take in less importance at higher levels of overall size.  The log of the 
total population has a minimum of 10.97 (Enid, OK MSA) and a maximum of 
16.07 (Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA MSA). 
6. Year the Central City reached 50k.  Previous segregation research has suggested 
that older metropolitan areas have higher levels of segregation between blacks 
and whites (Logan et al. 2004).  Older metropolitans contain neighborhoods that 
were likelier to have been developed during times of overt racist policies, as well 
as from historical population patterns and economic hardships, previously 
mentioned (Logan et al. 2004).  The Year the Central City reached 50k is 
determined by the decade (decennial Census) that the central city of the 
Metropolitan area reached a population of 50,000.  Year the Central City reached 
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50k is then operationalized as a dummy variable and broken into four time 
periods:   
   1900 and earlier (M = .21 SD = .41) 
   1910-1940 (M = .25 SD = .43)  
   1950-1960 (M = .12 SD = .33) 
   1970 and later (M = .27 SD = .44).   
 Most of the Central Cities reached a 50,000 population.  Central cities that never 
 reached a 50,000 population remain as the reference group. 
 
 The listed control variables are not exhaustive of all possibilities but are adequate 
to serve the needs of this study.  Research studies have used other social and economic 
variables which include economic specialization, percent black population, region, 
supply of new housing, suburbanization, total size of the population, total labor force in 
public administration and metropolitan per capita income to analyze residential 
segregation.  While these variables could have been included in this research study they 
are essentially different variations of, or have close relationships with, those already 
being used as control variables.  Accordingly, they add little potential value to the 
analysis, as including them could result in multi-collinearity, erratic estimates of 
coefficients, and other problems.   
 To confirm this notion, a few of the variables listed as being used in other 
research studies were included in the analysis to determine whether they should be 
included in the final analysis or not.  The findings indicated that while the variables were 
sometimes associated with segregation it did not serve the purpose of this study to 
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include them.  For example, Region captures much of the phenomena that Year the 
Central City reached 50k captures, but distorts the results when included simultaneously 
with Year the Central City reached 50k.  The year that the central city reached 50k and 
the region that the MSA is located in are closely related as a result of historical patterns 
of settlement and urban growth.  Cities that are located in the Northeast and parts of the 
South were settled well before cities on the West.  The time of the city’s settlement and 
the start of its population growth are closely related to the region that the core city is 
located in.  
 Note that Year the Central City reached 50k is a multi-category variable 
represented by multiple dummy variables.  In standard regression analyses one category 
is omitted and serves as a “reference point” for interpreting the effects of the other 
dummy variables.  Because the choice of the reference category is arbitrary, one cannot 
definitively ascertain the strength and significance of the individual dummy variables 
because their coefficients and t-ratios will vary depending on the arbitrary choice of the 
reference category.  They should instead be tested as a set because the several dummy 
variables are being used to assess the effect of a single conceptual variable (Kerlinger 
and Pedhazur 1973; Smith and Sasaki 1979).  For this reason, a Global F test was 
utilized to ascertain the significance of Year Central City reached 50k.  Utilizing a 
Global F test, the categorical dummy variables can be tested as a group to ascertain 
whether Year Central City reached 50k improves the model predictions significantly.   
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Table 1, below, summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables.  Table 2, 
below, summarizes the descriptive statistics of all variables in the final analyses utilizing 
MSAs with a minimum 50,000 total households and a minimum 2,500 black households. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Segregation, Political Fragmentation, and Control Variables 
  Variable N Mean 
Standard  
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Segregation  
Measures 
Dissimilarity (D) 331 49.96 14 18.8 84.6 
Gini (G) 331 64.23 15.22 25.6 94.4 
Entropy (H) 331 25.28 14.9 1.6 69.8 
Correlation Ratio (V) 331 23.46 18 0.1 75 
Fragmentation 
Measures 
Total Number of Cities per 1 Million Population 331 78.77 51.32 3.84 296.62 
Total Number of Cities 2,500+ per 1 Million Population 331 32.81 14.89 3.84 86.12 
Total Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 Million Population 331 13.02 5.81 2.68 35.93 
MSA Population Share Residing Outside Largest City 331 64.22 19.05 0 97.95 
MSA Population Share Residing Within Cities 331 71.87 15.53 22.8 100 
Gini Concentration Ratio 331 26.55 10.79 8.44 100 
Control  
Variables 
Percentage of the Labor Force in the Armed Forces 331 1.31 3.74 0.01 38.07 
Percentage of Housing Units built post-Fair Housing Act 1970+ 331 53.19 14.74 19 90.18 
Percentage of Housing Units Vacant 331 8.17 4.51 2.17 35.03 
Percentage of the White Population 331 79.65 12.15 21.16 97.5 
Total Population (Log) 331 12.77 1.04 10.97 16.07 
Year the Central City Reached 50k Population 1900 & Earlier* 69 0.2085 0.4068 0 1 
Year the Central City Reached 50k Population 1910 to 1940* 82 0.2477 0.4324 0 1 
Year the Central City Reached 50k Population 1950 to 1960* 42 0.1269 0.3333 0 1 
Year the Central City Reached 50k Population 1970 & Later* 89 0.2689 0.4441 0 1 
 
*Dummy Variable - Central Cities that never reached 50k population is the reference category 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Segregation, Political Fragmentation, and Control Variables (MSA’s with a  
Minimum 50,000 Total Households and a Minimum 2,500 Black Households) 
 
  Variable N Mean 
Standard  
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Segregation  
Measures 
Dissimilarity (D) 205 55.9454 11.8046 29.5 84.6 
Gini (G) 205 71.1005 11.823 42.9 94.4 
Entropy (H) 205 32.1698 13.1629 7.9 69.8 
Correlation Ratio (V) 205 32.0776 15.6827 2.7 75 
Fragmentation 
Measures 
Total Number of Cities per 1 Million Population 205 63.8755 35.0303 3.8420 226.7355 
Total Number of Cities 2,500+ per 1 Million Population 205 31.3634 13.8858 3.8420 80.9624 
Total Number of Cities 10,000+ per 1 Million Population 205 12.9691 5.783 2.6764 35.5857 
MSA Population Share Residing Outside Largest City 205 68.5431 17.5051 0 97.9464 
MSA Population Share Residing Within Cities 205 72.2608 16.7236 22.8001 100 
Gini Concentration Ratio 205 25.2166 10.9237 8.44 100 
Control  
Variables 
Percentage of the Labor Force in the Armed Forces 205 1.3218 3.401 0.01 24.15 
Percentage of Housing Units built post-Fair Housing Act 
1970+ 205 53.7358 15.0083 19 90.18 
Percentage of Housing Units Vacant 205 8.1692 4.4829 2.32 33.13 
Percentage of the White Population 205 76.1959 11.3526 21.16 96.16 
Total Population (Log) 205 13.2802 0.9681 11.8041 16.0688 
Year the Central City Reached 50k Population 1900 & Earlier* 61 0.2976 0.4583 0 1 
Year the Central City Reached 50k Population 1910 to 1940* 70 0.3415 0.4754 0 1 
Year the Central City Reached 50k Population 1950 to 1960* 28 0.1366 0.3442 0 1 
Year the Central City Reached 50k Population 1970 & Later* 32 0.1561 0.3638 0 1 
 *Dummy Variable - Central Cities that never reached 50k population is the reference category 
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CHAPTER VI  
RESULTS 
Several linear regression models of analysis were designed to ascertain the 
impact or effect of the independent variable on the dissimilarity index of the MSAs.  
Several models were developed with the dissimilarity index and independent variable 
with the previously listed control variables.  Also, linear regression models were 
developed to include several alternative segregation indices previously mentioned.  In 
addition, alternative measures of political fragmentation were included in regression 
models for comparative purposes.   
The regression models were designed to ascertain the strength of the impact of 
political fragmentation, the primary independent variable, on the dependent variable, and 
to ascertain how that strength differs with the addition the control variables.  As such, 
several different model variations, a total of 336, were developed that included the 
control variables, as well as without them.  Every model will not be focused on 
specifically rather they will be used to evaluate the robustness of control effects across 
different specifications.  The model equations that contain all of the control variables 
will be given particular attention to. 
Dissimilarity and Fragmentation 
 Tables 3 - 8, below, list the different model variations that include the 
dissimilarity index.   Table 3 displays the model analyses for dissimilarity and the first 
fragmentation measure, the total number of cities per 1 million population.  This 
particular fragmentation measure displays a somewhat weak relationship in all of the 
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variations.  This relationship is proven to be insignificant in all of the model variations 
except for the model (6), which includes the total population (log).  In the model with 
total population (log), the fragmentation measure has a coefficient of 5.381, meaning 
that for every unit increase in the measure of political fragmentation there is a 5.381 
average increase in residential segregation.   
 The control variables listed with the first fragmentation measure display a much 
stronger and significant relationship with dissimilarity, compared to the strength of 
fragmentation.  In models 8-14, the percentage of the housing units that are vacant 
displayed a weak to moderate, significant, relationship with residential segregation.  In 
this particular model, the percentage of the housing units vacant has a coefficient of 
.844, meaning that for every unit increase in percentage vacant there is an average of 
.844 unit increase in dissimilarity.  In every model, the percentage of the housing units 
that were built after the Fair Housing Act displayed a moderate, significant, relationship 
with residential segregation.  This relationship ranged from a coefficient of -.315 in 
model 9 to a -.478 in model 13.  In model 13, for every unit increase in the percentage of 
housing units built after the Fair Housing Act there is a .478 average unit decrease in 
residential segregation.  The log of the total population also displayed a weak to 
moderate, significant, relationship in every model variation except for model 11.   
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The log of the total population displayed its greatest strength when placed as a 
lone control variable in model 6.  In this model, total population (log) estimated a 
regression coefficient of 5.381 indicating that for every unit increase in the log of the 
total population there is an average of 5.381 unit increase in residential segregation.   
 Year the Central City reached 50k is assessed using a set of dummy variables.  F 
tests for the set of dummy variables indicate that Year the Central City reached 50k does 
not have a significant impact on dissimilarity.  Although Year the Central City reached 
50k produces insignificant results in the Global F test, the variable displays a pattern 
where older cities have higher levels of segregation.  The effects grew larger with each 
age step in a near linear fashion.  Contrasts between the central city reaching 50,000 
population by 1900 & earlier, and 1910-1940, were especially large in comparison with 
the reference category.  
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Table 3. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities per 1 Million Population - Dissimilarity (D) 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities per 1 
Million 0.004 -0.015 0.013 -0.007 -0.014 0.059* 0.036 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.020) 
% White 
 
0.161* 
     
  
(0.078) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.253 
    
   
(0.191) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.204*** 
   
    
(0.230) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.459*** 
  
     
(0.045) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
5.381*** 
 
      
(0.842) 
 Year Central City reached 50k        
1900 & earlier 
      
16.729 
        1910-1940 
      
8.821 
        1950-1960 
      
3.437 
        1970 and later 
      
-2.071 
        Constant 55.662*** 44.692*** 57.185*** 57.967*** 81.543*** -19.302 45.529*** 
 
(1.722) (5.615) (2.068) (1.679) (2.910) (11.830) (3.150) 
N 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 3. (continued) 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities per 1 Million -0.004 0.016 -0.004 0.019 -0.024 -0.012 -0.009 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) 
% White 
 
0.068 0.110 0.099 0.013 0.061 0.063 
  
(0.063) (0.058) (0.067) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
% Housing Vacant 0.844*** 
 
0.840*** 0.371* 0.792*** 0.768*** 0.841*** 
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.163) (0.168) (0.164) (0.153) (0.159) 
% Armed Forces -0.639*** -0.587** 
 
-0.692** -0.679*** -0.628*** -0.590** 
 
(0.177) (0.195) 
 
(0.208) (0.187) (0.182) (0.182) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.427*** -0.315*** -0.435*** 
 
-0.377*** -0.478*** -0.423*** 
 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) 
 
(0.055) (0.045) (0.054) 
Total Population (Log) 3.020*** 2.862** 3.547*** 1.816 
 
4.166*** 3.213*** 
 
(0.807) (0.879) (0.840) (0.923) 
 
(0.683) (0.826) 
Year Central City reached 50k        
1900 & earlier 7.623 4.346 8.077 15.966 12.621 
 
7.670 
 
       
1910-1940 6.122 2.716 6.784 9.554 8.379 
 
6.329 
 
       
1950-1960 4.494 0.874 5.303 4.350 5.751 
 
4.730 
 
       
1970 and later 2.569 -0.948 2.602 0.840 2.297 
 
2.860 
 
       
Constant 27.587* 27.189* 11.368 12.235 63.443*** 16.958 20.137 
 
(10.768) (13.621) (12.845) (14.641) (6.603) (11.938) (12.833) 
N 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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 Table 4 displays the model analyses for dissimilarity and the second 
fragmentation measure, the total number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 
1 million MSA residents.  This fragmentation measure displays a weak, and mostly 
insignificant, relationship throughout all of the models.  In models 3, 6, and 7, 
fragmentation displays a weak but significant relationship.  Its greatest strength is in 
model 7, which estimates a regression coefficient of .169 indicating that for every unit 
increase in fragmentation there is a .169 average unit increase in residential segregation.   
 The control variables continue to display a weak to strong, significant, 
relationship with residential segregation, mostly.  Percentage of the housing units vacant 
displayed a significant relationship with the exception of model 11.  Model 10 is where 
percentage of the housing units vacant displayed its strongest relationship.  In this 
model, percentage of the housing units vacant estimates a regression coefficient of .833 
indicating that for every unit increase in percentage of the housing units vacant there is 
an average of .833 unit increase in residential segregation.  Percentage of the population 
in the armed forces maintained a negative, but significant, relationship in all of the 
models with its greatest strength in model 4, which is the variation with no other control 
variables.  In this model, percentage of the population in the armed forces estimated a 
regression coefficient of -1.175 indicating that for every unit increase in the percentage 
of the population in the armed forces there is a 1.175 average unit decrease in residential 
segregation.   
 The percentage of the housing units built after the Fair Housing Act continued to 
maintain a moderately, significant, relationship with residential segregation.  Its greatest 
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strength was in model 13, which contains all of the control variables except for Year the 
Central City reached 50k.  In this model, percentage of the housing units built after the 
Fair Housing Act estimated a regression coefficient of -.482 indicating that for every 
unit increase in the percentage of housing units built post-FHA there is an average of 
.482 unit decrease in residential segregation.  The log of the total population also 
generated positive, significant, results in all of the model variations with model 6 
containing its greatest strength.  In this model, the log of the total population estimated a 
4.79 regression coefficient indicating that for every unit increase in the log of the total 
population there is a 4.79 unit increase in residential segregation.   
 As mentioned previously, the effect of Year the Central City reached 50k was 
assessed utilizing an F test.  The Global F test for this model estimated a .15 which 
proves to be insignificant.  Although insignificant, Year the Central City reached 50k 
continued to maintain a near linear relationship with segregation.  In general, older cities 
have higher levels of segregation.  MSA’s that reached a 50,000 population 1900 & 
earlier, and those reached it between 1910 and 1940, had their greatest strength in model 
7.
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Table 4. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 Million Population - Dissimilarity 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 
Million 0.104 0.075 0.156* 0.085 0.060 0.138* 0.169** 
 
(0.059) (0.062) (0.064) (0.056) (0.049) (0.055) (0.053) 
% White 
 
0.115 
     
  
(0.076) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.416* 
    
   
(0.198) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.175*** 
   
    
(0.228) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.451*** 
  
     
(0.045) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
4.792*** 
 
      
(0.787) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
18.689 
        1910-1940 
      
11.558 
        1950-1960 
      
6.265 
        1970 and later 
      
0.261 
        Constant 52.692*** 44.856*** 54.441*** 54.843*** 78.318*** -12.019 40.235*** 
 
(2.030) (5.566) (2.178) (1.959) (3.055) (10.787) (3.683) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       
(continued) 
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Table 4. (Continued) 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 Million 0.009 0.098 -0.001 0.105 0.027 -0.040 -0.003 
 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.053) (0.056) (0.053) (0.049) (0.051) 
% White 
 
0.052 0.107 0.083 -0.014 0.064 0.057 
  
(0.062) (0.058) (0.066) (0.058) (0.059) (0.058) 
% Housing Vacant 0.825*** 
 
0.833*** 0.293 0.707*** 0.806*** 0.828*** 
 
(0.168) 
 
(0.172) (0.174) (0.172) (0.167) (0.168) 
% Armed Forces -0.632*** -0.592** 
 
-0.694*** -0.666*** -0.619*** -0.585** 
 
(0.175) (0.193) 
 
(0.206) (0.188) (0.182) (0.182) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.422*** -0.305*** -0.433*** 
 
-0.355*** -0.482*** -0.419*** 
 
(0.055) (0.053) (0.056) 
 
(0.055) (0.046) (0.055) 
Total Population (Log) 3.050*** 2.572** 3.583*** 1.502 
 
4.318*** 3.291*** 
 
(0.780) (0.852) (0.832) (0.890) 
 
(0.657) (0.818) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 7.773 6.178 8.080 17.039 13.344 
 
7.664 
        1910-1940 6.297 4.646 6.791 10.958 9.022 
 
6.331 
        1950-1960 4.678 2.730 5.322 5.822 6.402 
 
4.759 
        1970 and later 2.633 0.343 2.569 1.854 2.310 
 
2.783 
        Constant 26.444** 28.092* 10.830 15.029 62.092*** 15.141 18.975 
 
(9.955) (13.144) (12.593) (14.256) (6.801) (11.581) (12.562) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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 Table 5, below, displays the model analyses for dissimilarity and the third 
fragmentation measure, the total number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 
1 million MSA population.  This particular measure of fragmentation displays a slightly 
greater than weak relationship with dissimilarity but is significant in only five of the 
models.  This measure of fragmentation has its greatest strength in model 7 which is the 
model variation that includes control variable Year the Central City reached 50k.  In this 
model, political fragmentation estimated a .303 regression coefficient indicating that for 
every unit increase in fragmentation there is a .303 average unit increase in residential 
segregation.   
 The control variables in these models also maintained moderately strong and 
significant relationships with dissimilarity.  The percentage of the housing units that are 
vacant produced moderately strong coefficients that were significant in all models except 
for model 3.  Its greatest strength, in model 10, estimated a .794 regression coefficient 
indicating for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing units residential 
segregation would increase an average of .794 units.  The percentage of the labor force 
in the armed forces maintained a negative, but significant, relationship in all of the 
models.  Model 4 estimates its greatest strength.  In this model, percentage of the labor 
force in the armed forces estimated a -1.252 regression coefficient indicating that for 
every unit increase in percentage in the armed forces residential segregation decreases 
by an average of 1.252 units.   
 Again, the percentage of the housing units built after the Fair Housing Act 
continued to maintain a moderately strong, and significant, relationship with 
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dissimilarity, with its greatest strength in model 13.  In model 13, the percentage of the 
housing units post-FHA estimated a -.469 regression coefficient indicating that for every 
unit increase in the percentage of housing unit built post-FHA residential segregation 
decreases by an average of .469 units.  The log of the total population maintained a 
strong, and significant, relationship in all of the models, with its strongest coefficient in 
model 6.  In this model, the log of the total population estimated a 4.511 regression 
coefficient indicating that for every unit increase in the log of the total population 
dissimilarity increases an average of 4.511 units.   
 In this model, Year the Central City reached 50k estimated a .05 in the Global F 
test which proves to be significant.  In addition, Year the Central City reached 50k 
continued to maintain a near linear relationship with segregation.  In general, older cities 
have higher levels of segregation.  This is indicated by the positive effects indicating 
deviation from the reference category of central cities that never reached a 50,000 
population.  The effects grew larger with each age step in a near linear fashion.  
Contrasts between the central city reaching 50,000 population by 1900 & earlier, and 
1910-1940, were especially large in comparison with the reference category.  Central 
Cities that reached a 50,000 population 1900 & earlier, and those reached it between 
1910 and 1940, had their greatest strength in model 11.  Model 11 includes all of the 
control variables with the exception of percent of the housing units built post-FHA. 
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Table 5. Residential Segregation and Total Number of Cities 10k+ per 1 Million Population - Dissimilarity 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities 10K per 1 
Million  0.203 0.216 0.253 0.286* 0.216 0.119 0.303* 
 
(0.143) (0.142) (0.145) (0.134) (0.116) (0.134) (0.125) 
% White 
 
0.147* 
     
  
(0.072) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.297 
    
   
(0.188) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.252*** 
   
    
(0.228) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.457*** 
  
     
(0.045) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
4.511*** 
 
      
(0.798) 
 Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 
      
17.265 
        1910-1940 
      
10.091 
        1950-1960 
      
4.399 
        1970 and later 
      
-1.076 
        Constant 53.310*** 41.932*** 55.091*** 53.894*** 77.703*** -5.495 42.994*** 
 
(2.023) (5.924) (2.309) (1.895) (2.899) (10.576) (3.480) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 5. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities 10K per 1 
Million  0.163 0.280* 0.125 0.302* 0.264* 0.064 0.166 
 
(0.110) (0.114) (0.112) (0.123) (0.110) (0.106) (0.110) 
% White 
 
0.083 0.111* 0.115 0.005 0.052 0.059 
  
(0.060) (0.056) (0.064) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) 
% Housing Vacant 0.789*** 
 
0.794*** 0.333* 0.674*** 0.718*** 0.775*** 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.161) (0.165) (0.159) (0.154) (0.157) 
% Armed Forces -0.666*** -0.648*** 
 
-0.755*** -0.704*** -0.637*** -0.615*** 
 
(0.175) (0.193) 
 
(0.206) (0.186) (0.184) (0.182) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.413*** -0.307*** -0.424*** 
 
-0.350*** -0.469*** -0.405*** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.055) 
 
(0.053) (0.045) (0.053) 
Total Population (Log) 2.746*** 2.239* 3.358*** 1.146 
 
4.208*** 2.975*** 
 
(0.802) (0.865) (0.845) (0.903) 
 
(0.668) (0.831) 
Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 8.756 6.437 8.969 17.683 14.053 
 
8.846 
        1910-1940 7.349 4.960 7.751 11.593 10.258 
 
7.606 
        1950-1960 5.559 2.795 6.153 6.142 7.515 
 
5.857 
        1970 and later 3.055 0.275 2.958 1.977 3.027 
 
3.322 
        Constant 27.619** 29.595* 10.919 15.947 57.159*** 15.433 19.511 
 
(9.757) (13.045) (12.554) (14.176) (6.943) (11.596) (12.494) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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 Table 6, below, displays the model analyses for dissimilarity and the fourth 
fragmentation measure, the share of the MSA population residing outside of the largest 
city.  The fourth measure of fragmentation maintains a weak to moderate relationship 
that is significant, except for models 8, 10, 13, and 14.  Fragmentation has its greatest 
strength in model 3, which is the model variation that includes percent housing vacant.  
In this model, fragmentation estimated a .214 regression coefficient indicating that for 
every unit increase in fragmentation there is a .214 average unit increase in residential 
segregation.   
 Regarding the control variables, the percentage of the housing units that are 
vacant displays a moderate relationship with residential segregation that is mostly 
significant, with the exception of model 11.  The percentage of the housing units that are 
vacant maintains its strongest relationship in model 14 which is the model variation that 
contains all of the variables together.  In this model, the percentage the housing units that 
are vacant estimated a .767 regression coefficient indicating that for every unit increase 
in the percentage of the housing units that are vacant there is a .767 average unit increase 
in residential segregation.  The percentage of the labor force that is in the armed forces 
maintains a negative, significant, relationship in all of the models.  Its greatest strength is 
in the model that includes no other control variables, model 4.  In this model, the 
percentage of the labor force in the armed forces estimated a -1.044 regression 
coefficient indicating that for every unit increase in percent in armed forces there is an 
average decrease of 1.044 units in dissimilarity.   
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 The percentage of the housing units built after the Fair Housing Act continues to 
maintain a very significant relationship with residential segregation with its greatest 
strength in model 13, which is the model variation that includes all of the control 
variables except for Year the Central City reached 50k.  In this model, for every unit 
increase in the percentage of the housing units built post-FHA there is a .469 average 
unit decrease in dissimilarity.  The log of the total population maintains a moderately 
strong, significant, relationship with the exception of model 11.  Its greatest strength is in 
13 which is the model variation that includes all of the control variables except for Year 
the Central City reached 50k.  In this model, for every unit increase in the log of the 
total population, dissimilarity increases an average 4.173 units.   
 In this model, Year the Central City reached 50k estimated a .06 in the Global F 
test which proves to be significant at the .10 level.  As in the previous tables, Year 
Central City reached 50k maintained a near linear relationship with older central cities 
having greater amounts of segregation than younger central cities. MSAs with central 
cities that reached 50k 1900 and prior maintained the strongest positive relationship with 
dissimilarity.
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Table 6. Residential Segregation and MSA Population Share Outside Largest City - Dissimilarity 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City 0.195*** 0.184*** 0.214*** 0.157*** 0.141*** 0.144** 0.176*** 
 
(0.045) (0.047) (0.046) (0.044) (0.038) (0.044) (0.040) 
% White 
 
0.071 
     
  
(0.072) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.386* 
    
   
(0.179) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.044*** 
   
    
(0.227) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.432*** 
  
     
(0.044) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
3.979*** 
 
      
(0.797) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
17.709 
        1910-1940 
      
11.574 
        1950-1960 
      
5.887 
        1970 and later 
      
1.056 
        Constant 42.557*** 37.915*** 44.417*** 46.587*** 69.492*** -6.740 33.662*** 
 
(3.204) (5.683) (3.290) (3.178) (3.813) (10.329) (4.251) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 6. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City 0.060 0.106* 0.065 0.122** 0.105** 0.017 0.054 
 
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.044) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) 
% White 
 
0.038 0.080 0.062 -0.030 0.045 0.036 
  
(0.062) (0.058) (0.066) (0.056) (0.059) (0.059) 
% Housing Vacant 0.767*** 
 
0.761*** 0.306 0.651*** 0.721*** 0.767*** 
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.163) (0.166) (0.159) (0.158) (0.159) 
% Armed Forces -0.588** -0.551** 
 
-0.643** -0.600** -0.617*** -0.561** 
 
(0.176) (0.192) 
 
(0.205) (0.186) (0.183) (0.182) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.404*** -0.299*** -0.412*** 
 
-0.345*** -0.469*** -0.401*** 
 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.055) 
 
(0.053) (0.045) (0.054) 
Total Population (Log) 2.630** 1.867* 2.998*** 0.708 
 
4.173*** 2.819** 
 
(0.820) (0.902) (0.895) (0.937) 
 
(0.704) (0.878) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 8.941 6.881 9.463 17.909 13.786 
 
8.845 
        1910-1940 7.537 5.300 8.196 11.877 10.269 
 
7.533 
        1950-1960 5.663 2.959 6.421 6.316 7.458 
 
5.713 
        1970 and later 3.340 0.738 3.330 2.486 3.480 
 
3.414 
        Constant 26.565** 33.502* 14.452 21.140 55.922*** 16.049 21.626 
 
(9.735) (13.100) (12.711) (14.293) (6.955) (11.756) (12.658) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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 Table 7, below, displays the model analyses for dissimilarity and the fifth 
fragmentation measure, the share of the MSA population residing within cities.  The fifth 
fragmentation measure maintains a weak, negative, relationship in all of the model 
variations, with only five of the models being significant.  This particular measure has a 
slightly different interpretation than the previous measures of fragmentation.  The 
greater the measure of this fragmentation refers to a greater share of the population that 
is centralized, thus, the greater the measure, the less fragmentation the MSA is.  This 
measure displays its greatest strength in model 6 which is the model variation that 
includes the log of the total population.  In this model, for every unit increase in the 
share of the MSA population residing within cities residential segregation decreases an 
average .173 units.   
 Control variables continue to maintain the same direction as previous tables.  The 
percentage of the housing units that are vacant maintains a moderately positive 
relationship that is significant in almost all of the models except for model 3.  Its greatest 
strength, model 8, displays that for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing 
units that are vacant there is an average of .805 unit increase in residential segregation.  
The percentage of the labor force in the armed forces continues to maintain a negative, 
significant, relationship in all of the models.  Its greatest strength, in model 4, shows that 
for every unit increase in the percentage of the labor force in the armed forces there is an 
average decrease in residential segregation by 1.193 units.   
 The percentage of the housing units built after the Fair Housing Act continues to 
maintain its moderately, significant, relationship with residential segregation.  In its 
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greatest strength, in model 13, for every unit increase in the percentage of housing units 
built post-FHA residential segregation decreases by an average of .466 points.  The log 
of the total population maintains its positive, and very significant, relationship with 
residential segregation.  In its greatest strength, in model 6, which is the model with no 
other control variables, for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing units 
built post-FHA there is an average decrease of 5.795 units in residential segregation.   
 In this model, Year the Central City reached 50k estimated a .0963 in the Global 
F test which proves to be significant at the .10 level.  Central cities that reached a 50,000 
population 1900 & earlier displayed its greatest strength in model 7.  Central cities that 
reached a 50,000 population 1910 and 1940 displayed their greatest strengths in model 
11.  MSA’s with older central cities maintained a pattern of having greater amounts of 
segregation than MSA’s with younger central cities. 
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Table 7. Residential Segregation and MSA Population Share Residing Within Largest City - Dissimilarity 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        MSA Population Share Residing 
within Cities -0.038 -0.002 -0.053 -0.007 -0.026 -0.173*** -0.092* 
 
(0.049) (0.053) (0.050) (0.047) (0.040) (0.049) (0.042) 
% White 
 
0.141 
     
  
(0.078) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.266 
    
   
(0.188) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.193*** 
   
    
(0.231) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.455*** 
  
     
(0.045) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
5.795*** 
 
      
(0.842) 
 Year Central City  
       1900 & earlier 
      
17.396 
        1910-1940 
      
9.478 
        1950-1960 
      
3.940 
        1970 and later 
      
-1.066 
        Constant 58.725*** 45.325*** 61.942*** 57.999*** 82.271*** -8.485 53.775 
 
(3.669) (8.271) (4.307) (3.460) (3.797) (10.312) (3.559) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 7. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        MSA Population Share Residing within 
Cities -0.084* -0.096* -0.093* -0.079 -0.020 -0.074 -0.079 
 
(0.039) (0.043) (0.041) (0.046) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
% White 
 
0.049 0.073 0.089 -0.018 0.026 0.031 
  
(0.061) (0.057) (0.066) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) 
% Housing Vacant 0.805*** 
 
0.802*** 0.374* 0.731*** 0.708*** 0.800*** 
 
(0.153) 
 
(0.156) (0.165) (0.160) (0.149) (0.153) 
% Armed Forces -0.567** -0.548** 
 
-0.666** -0.662*** -0.583** -0.544** 
 
(0.176) (0.193) 
 
(0.208) (0.188) (0.182) (0.182) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.422*** -0.323*** -0.432*** 
 
-0.360*** -0.466*** -0.419*** 
 
(0.052) (0.052) (0.053) 
 
(0.053) (0.044) (0.053) 
Total Population (Log) 3.744*** 3.387*** 4.196*** 2.156* 
 
4.706*** 3.830*** 
 
(0.832) (0.899) (0.856) (0.944) 
 
(0.689) (0.848) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 7.892 4.536 8.306 16.295 13.314 
 
7.913 
        1910-1940 6.851 3.313 7.428 10.089 8.874 
 
6.933 
        1950-1960 5.377 1.562 6.084 4.855 6.237 
 
5.475 
        1970 and later 3.520 0.125 3.531 1.717 2.266 
 
3.601 
        Constant 23.174* 29.517* 11.626 14.832 64.764*** 16.894 19.079 
 
(9.824) (13.076) (12.433) (14.277) (7.583) (11.536) (12.439) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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 Table 8, below, displays the model analyses for dissimilarity and the sixth 
fragmentation measure, the Gini concentration.  This particular measure of 
fragmentation maintained a very weak relationship in all of the model variations.  These 
relationships never reached significance in the models so its discussion will be short.   
 The percentage of the housing units that are vacant maintained a moderate, 
significant, relationship in all of the models except for model 3.  Its greatest strength, in 
model 8, shows that for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing units that are 
vacant there is a .837 average unit increase in residential segregation.  The percentage of 
the labor force in the armed forces maintains a moderate, negative, relationship 
throughout all of the models.  Its greatest strength, in model 4, which is the model that 
contains no other control variables, shows that for every unit increase in the percentage 
of the labor force that are in the armed forces residential segregation decreases an 
average of 1.175 units.   
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The percentage of the housing units built after the Fair Housing Act continues to 
display a moderately negative, and significant, relationship in all of the model variations.  
Its greatest strength, in model 13, shows that for every unit increase in the percentage of 
the housing units built post-FHA there is an average .474 unit decrease in residential 
segregation.   
Total Population (log) maintains a strong, significant, relationship in all of the 
models.  Its greatest strength, in model 6, which is the model with no other control 
variables, it shows that for every unit increase in the log of the total population 
residential segregation decreases an average of 4.523 units.  Year Central City reached 
50k estimated a .1311 in the Global F test which proves to be insignificant.  In addition, 
Year Central City reached 50k displays a varying relationship in the equation that does 
not maintain a pattern displayed in previous models. 
 Throughout all of the models, the percentage of the population that is white 
proved to be insignificant and not much of a determinant in the degree of dissimilarity 
relative to the other control variables.  Accordingly, it receives little attention in the 
discussions of effects.  The additional control variables continued to maintain their 
relationships with residential segregation.  The maintenance of the control variable 
pattern provides robustness and confidence in fragmentation’s effect on residential 
segregation.   
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Fragmentation, in all of its variations, maintained a consistent positive 
relationship with residential segregation that leads us to conclude that as fragmentation 
increases so will dissimilarity.  The primary focus of this study is on the effect of the 
third fragmentation measure, total number of cities 10k per 1 million MSA residents.  
The third fragmentation is the most commonly used measure of fragmentation because 
of its ability to capture the degree of MSA fragmentation while not being manipulated 
by places with smaller to zero populations.  Total number of cities 10k per 1 million 
MSA residents maintained a positive direction in all model equations.   
 Utilizing the two-tailed test, fragmentation reaches significance in five out of the 
fourteen models.  Fragmentation was predicted to have a positive effect on residential 
segregation and as such would have proven to be significant more often in a one-tailed 
test.  In model 14, which is the model equation that contains all of the control variables, 
fragmentation is insignificant in the two-tailed test.  Fragmentation estimated a 1.51 t-
value which reaches significance at the .1 level in a one-tailed test.   
Models where fragmentation is insignificant its effect size is small and 
competing with control variables that may have greater effects on residential 
segregation, such as Total Population and Year Central City reached 50k. Given the 
results as a whole, it would be safe to determine that fragmentation has a positive 
contribution to the degree of segregation within MSAs.   
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Table 8. Residential Segregation and Gini Concentration - Dissimilarity 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Gini Concentration -0.101 -0.092 -0.094 -0.054 -0.094 -0.038 0.036 
 
(0.076) (0.075) (0.076) (0.072) (0.062) (0.071) (0.067) 
% White 
 
0.137 
     
  
(0.072) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.208 
    
   
(0.184) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.175*** 
   
    
(0.231) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.455*** 
  
     
(0.045) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
4.523*** 
 
      
(0.804) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
16.088 
        1910-1940 
      
8.265 
        1950-1960 
      
2.551 
        1970 and later 
      
-2.342 
        Constant 58.496*** 47.837*** 60.026*** 58.870*** 82.797*** -3.174 47.457 
 
(2.074) (6.000) (2.477) (1.959) (2.930) (11.138) (3.378) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 8. (Continued) 
 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Gini Concentration 0.001 0.013 -0.004 0.074 0.001 -0.031 0.007 
 
(0.056) (0.060) (0.057) (0.063) (0.058) (0.054) (0.056) 
% White 
 
0.082 0.107 0.121 -0.008 0.049 0.057 
  
(0.061) (0.056) (0.065) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
% Housing Vacant 0.837*** 
 
0.832*** 0.405* 0.740*** 0.749*** 0.824*** 
 
(0.154) 
 
(0.158) (0.165) (0.159) (0.149) (0.154) 
% Armed Forces -0.635*** -0.601** 
 
-0.719*** -0.669*** -0.613*** -0.586** 
 
(0.176) (0.195) 
 
(0.207) (0.188) (0.183) (0.182) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.425*** -0.317*** -0.434*** 
 
-0.362*** -0.474*** -0.417*** 
 
(0.053) (0.054) (0.055) 
 
(0.054) (0.045) (0.054) 
Total Population (Log) 3.060*** 2.709** 3.579*** 1.684 
 
4.224*** 3.288*** 
 
(0.777) (0.858) (0.824) (0.895) 
 
(0.664) (0.810) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 7.645 4.292 8.045 16.624 13.055 
 
7.771 
        1910-1940 6.155 2.634 6.756 10.234 8.654 
 
6.442 
        1950-1960 4.537 0.672 5.306 4.654 6.026 
 
4.839 
        1970 and later 2.557 -0.961 2.569 1.081 2.097 
 
2.812 
        Constant 26.735** 29.065* 11.078 10.900 62.838*** 17.079 18.624 
 
(10.017) (13.629) (12.992) (14.697) (7.193) (12.033) (12.908) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Gini and Fragmentation 
 
In an effort to assess whether the results are “robust” with respect to the choice 
for measuring the dependent variable, I compared the findings of my primary analysis 
using the index of dissimilarity, with results of regression models which used the Gini 
index as the dependent variables (Tables 9-14, below).  This particular measure of 
segregation continued to maintain patterns with fragmentation and control variables seen 
in previous models with dissimilarity.   
Table 9, below, displays the model analyses for the Gini index and the 
fragmentation measure, the total number of cities per 1 million MSA residents. This 
particular measure of fragmentation maintains a very weak, and mostly insignificant, 
relationship with the Gini index.  Of the two models that are estimated to be significant, 
model 6 contains its strongest relationship.  In this model, for every unit increase in 
political fragmentation the Gini index increases an average of .065 units.   
In regards to the control variables, the percentage of the population that is white 
was significant in two models, with its greatest strength in model 2, which is the model 
with no other control variables.  In this model, for every unit increase in the percentage 
of the population that is white the gini index has a .169 average unit increase.   
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The percentage of the housing units that are vacant proved to be significant in all 
of the models, except for the model that contains no other control variables, with its 
greatest strength in model 8.  In this model, for every unit increase in the percentage of 
the housing units that are vacant residential segregation increases by an average of .889 
units.   
As with all of the previous models, the percentage of the labor force that is in the 
armed forces maintains a negative, and very significant, relationship with the Gini index.  
In its greatest strength, model 4, which is the model without other control variables, for 
every unit increase in the percentage of the labor force that is in the armed forces 
residential segregation decreases by an average of 1.303 units.   
The percentage of the housing units built after the Fair Housing Act also 
continues to maintain a negatively moderate, and significant, relationship with the Gini 
index.  In its greatest strength, model 13, which is the model that contains all other 
control variables with the exception of Year Central City reached 50k, for every unit 
increase in the percentage of the housing units built post-FHA, residential segregation 
decreases an average .447 units.   
 
 
 
 
 
 72 
 
Total population (log) maintains a very significant, and positive, relationship 
with the Gini index.  In its greatest strength, model 6, which is the model that contains 
no other control variables, for every unit increase in the log of the total population 
residential segregation increases an average of 5.425 units.   
Again, Year Central City reached 50k continued to maintain direction in the 
models as in previous equations that utilized the dissimilarity.  Year Central City 
reached 50k displayed a positive relationship with Gini meaning MSA’s with older 
central cities had greater levels of residential segregation.  Segregation levels then 
declined as MSA’s contained younger central cities.  MSA’s with central cities that 
reached 50k after the Fair Housing Act had a negative effect on segregation levels.  A 
Global F test was conducted to determine Year Central City reached 50k’s significance.  
Year Central City reached 50k estimated a .0277 which reaches significance at the .05 
level.
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Table 9. Gini Analysis with Total Number of Cities per 1 Million Population 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities per 1 
Million 0.010 -0.011 0.016 -0.002 -0.008 0.065** 0.042* 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.020) (0.023) (0.020) 
% White 
 
0.169* 
     
  
(0.078) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.190 
    
   
(0.192) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.303*** 
   
    
(0.228) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.432*** 
  
     
(0.047) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
5.425*** 
 
      
(0.841) 
 Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 
      
16.977 
        1910-1940 
      
9.679 
        1950-1960 
      
4.080 
        1970 and later 
      
-1.891 
        Constant 70.483*** 58.917*** 71.625*** 72.977*** 94.840*** -5.090 59.782*** 
 
(1.724) (5.616) (2.074) (1.662) (2.999) (11.828) (3.151) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 9. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities per 1 Million 0.003 0.023 0.002 0.022 -0.018 -0.007 -0.003 
 
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
% White 
 
0.077 0.128* 0.104 0.022 0.068 0.071 
  
(0.063) (0.059) (0.066) (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) 
% Housing Vacant 0.889*** 
 
0.884*** 0.462** 0.837*** 0.795*** 0.885*** 
 
(0.160) 
 
(0.165) (0.165) (0.165) (0.156) (0.160) 
% Armed Forces -0.755*** -0.696*** 
 
-0.791*** -0.786*** -0.748*** -0.699*** 
 
(0.178) (0.197) 
 
(0.205) (0.188) (0.185) (0.184) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.386*** -0.267*** -0.396*** 
 
-0.336*** -0.447*** -0.381*** 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.056) 
 
(0.055) (0.046) (0.054) 
Total Population (Log) 2.927*** 2.776** 3.540*** 1.886* 
 
4.272*** 3.145*** 
 
(0.812) (0.890) (0.853) (0.907) 
 
(0.694) (0.831) 
Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 9.108 5.663 9.643 16.636 14.007 
 
9.162 
        1910-1940 7.696 4.127 8.470 10.836 9.937 
 
7.931 
        1950-1960 5.439 1.648 6.385 5.365 6.706 
 
5.707 
        1970 and later 3.037 -0.642 3.061 1.547 2.816 
 
3.367 
        Constant 39.968*** 38.947** 21.133 24.404 73.914*** 28.126* 31.524* 
 
(10.844) (13.787) (13.052) (14.377) (6.631) (12.125) (12.913) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 10, below, displays the model analyses between the Gini index and the 
total number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million residents.  In this 
particular design, fragmentation maintains a weak relationship that is mostly 
insignificant.  Of the four models that achieve significance, its greatest strength, in 
model 7, which is the model that contains Year Central City reached 50k, for every unit 
increase in fragmentation there is a .178 average unit increase in the Gini index.   
For the control variables, the percentage of the population that is white continues 
be insignificant with the exception of model 10, which contains all of the control 
variables except for percent in armed forces.  In this model, for every unit increase in the 
percentage of the population that is white there is a .128 average unit increase in the Gini 
index.  The percentage of the housing units that are vacant maintains a moderately 
strong, and mostly significant, relationship with the Gini index.  In its greatest strength, 
in model 10, which contains all of the control variables except for percent in armed 
forces, for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing units that are vacant the 
Gini index increases an average .883 units.  The percentage of the labor force in the 
armed forces maintains a moderately strong, and significant, relationship in all of the 
models.  Its greatest strength, in model 4, which is the model without other control 
variables, shows that for every unit increase in the percentage of the labor force in the 
armed forces the Gini index decreases an average of 1.277 units.   
The percentage of the housing units built after the Fair Housing Act continues to 
maintain a moderately strong, negative, relationship that is significant in all of the 
models.  In its greatest strength, model 13, for every unit increase in the percentage of 
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the housing units built post-FHA the Gini index decreases an average of .455 units.  The 
log of the total population, again, displays its greatest strength in model 6, which is the 
model without other control variables.  In this model, for every unit increase in the total 
population (log) the Gini index increases an average 4.763 units.   
Year Central City reached 50k continued to maintain a similar pattern found in 
previous equations.  MSAs with older central cities had greater levels of residential 
segregation.  Segregation levels then decrease as the central city becomes younger.  The 
pattern is similar, and not identical, to previous equations because of central cities that 
reached a 50k population post-FHA.  In previous models, this category was estimated to 
have negative effects on residential segregation.  In Table 9, Year Central City reached 
50k 1970+ produced positive effects.  These effects still maintained a pattern of MSAs 
with younger central cities having lower levels of segregation.  In the Global F test Year 
Central City reached 50k produced a .0376 resulting in significance at the .05 level.
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Table 10. Gini Analysis with Total Number of Cities 2500 per 1 Million Population 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 
Million 0.106 0.074 0.148* 0.085 0.064 0.140* 0.178*** 
 
(0.059) (0.062) (0.064) (0.055) (0.050) (0.055) (0.053) 
% White 
 
0.129 
     
  
(0.076) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.337 
    
   
(0.199) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.277*** 
   
    
(0.226) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.425*** 
  
     
(0.046) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
4.763*** 
 
      
(0.789) 
 Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 
      
18.922 
        1910-1940 
      
12.447 
        1950-1960 
      
6.917 
        1970 and later 
      
0.526 
        Constant 67.782*** 58.980*** 69.197*** 70.121*** 91.930*** 3.466 54.603*** 
 
(2.033) (5.564) (2.189) (1.939) (3.144) (10.816) (3.687) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 10. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 
Million 0.016 0.109* 0.004 0.099 0.030 -0.046 0.002 
 
(0.050) (0.051) (0.054) (0.055) (0.053) (0.050) (0.052) 
% White 
 
0.063 0.128* 0.092 -0.000 0.076 0.068 
  
(0.063) (0.059) (0.065) (0.058) (0.059) (0.059) 
% Housing Vacant 0.874*** 
 
0.883*** 0.394* 0.761*** 0.851*** 0.877*** 
 
(0.169) 
 
(0.175) (0.171) (0.172) (0.169) (0.169) 
% Armed Forces -0.755*** -0.705*** 
 
-0.796*** -0.776*** -0.741*** -0.697*** 
 
(0.177) (0.195) 
 
(0.203) (0.188) (0.185) (0.183) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.383*** -0.258*** -0.396*** 
 
-0.317*** -0.455*** -0.379*** 
 
(0.056) (0.054) (0.057) 
 
(0.055) (0.047) (0.056) 
Total Population (Log) 2.875*** 2.402** 3.512*** 1.547 
 
4.383*** 3.165*** 
 
(0.785) (0.862) (0.846) (0.875) 
 
(0.667) (0.823) 
Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 9.332 7.627 9.697 17.675 14.663 
 
9.201 
        1910-1940 7.935 6.189 8.524 12.157 10.562 
 
7.975 
        1950-1960 5.661 3.608 6.430 6.720 7.338 
 
5.759 
        1970 and later 3.182 0.776 3.106 2.522 2.907 
 
3.362 
        Constant 40.096*** 40.803** 21.428 27.575 72.597*** 26.984* 31.142* 
 
(10.023) (13.300) (12.795) (14.019) (6.818) (11.751) (12.634) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 11, below, contains the model analyses for the Gini index and the total 
number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents.  This 
particular measure of fragmentation maintains a weak to strong relationship, with the 
Gini index, that is significant in five of the models.  Fragmentation displays its greatest 
strength in model 7, which is the model that contains control variable Year Central City 
reached 50k.  In this model, for every unit increase in fragmentation the Gini index 
increases an average .286 units.   
The percentage of the population that is white maintains a weak relationship that 
is significant in only two of the models.  Its greatest strength, in model 2, which contains 
no other control variables, for every unit increase in the percentage of the population that 
is white the Gini index increases an average .160 units.  The percentage of the housing 
units vacant maintains a moderately strong, and significant, relationship with the Gini 
index in almost all of the models.  Its greatest strength, in model 10, which is the model 
that contains all of the control variables except for percentage in the armed forces, 
shows that for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing units vacant there is 
an average of .856 unit increase in the Gini index.  The percentage of the labor force in 
the armed forces continues to maintain a negative, and significant, relationship with the 
Gini index.  Its greatest strength, in model 3, the model without other control variables, 
shows that for every unit increase in the percentage of the labor force in the armed forces 
there is a 1.351 average unit decrease in the Gini index.   
The percentage of the housing units built after the Fair Housing Act continues to 
maintain a negative, and very significant, relationship with the Gini index.  Its greatest 
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relationship, in model 13, for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing units 
built post-FHA there is a .442 average unit decrease in the Gini index.  The log of the 
total population also continues to maintain a positive, and very significant, relationship, 
with its strongest relationship in model 6.  In this model, for every unit increase in the 
log of the total population there is a 4.498 average unit increase in Gini index.  
Year Central City reached 50k continues to maintain a pattern seen in previous 
model equations.  MSA’s with older central cities had greater levels of residential 
segregation.  As the central cities become younger their segregation levels decrease.  
Unlike the models with dissimilarity, Year Central City reached 50k 1970+ estimated 
positive effects on residential segregation.  Although the result is positive, the multi-
categorical variable maintained segregation patterns seen in previous equations.  In a 
Global F test, Year Central City reached 50k estimated a .0118 resulting in significance 
at the .01 level. 
 81 
 
 
Table 11. Gini Analysis with Total Number of Cities 10k+ per 1 Million Population 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities 10K per 1 
Million  0.175 0.188 0.211 0.264* 0.187 0.090 0.286* 
 
(0.143) (0.142) (0.146) (0.133) (0.120) (0.134) (0.126) 
% White 
 
0.160* 
     
  
(0.072) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.215 
    
   
(0.189) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.351*** 
   
    
(0.226) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.431*** 
  
     
(0.046) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
4.498*** 
 
      
(0.801) 
 Year Central City reached 50k** 
       1900 & earlier 
      
17.262 
        1910-1940 
      
10.665 
        1950-1960 
      
4.725 
        1970 and later 
      
-1.027 
        Constant 68.834*** 56.451*** 70.126*** 69.464*** 91.852*** 10.201 58.124*** 
 
(2.029) (5.930) (2.323) (1.878) (2.992) (10.616) (3.498) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 11. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities 10K per 1 
Million  0.152 0.278* 0.108 0.279* 0.251* 0.033 0.156 
 
(0.111) (0.116) (0.114) (0.121) (0.110) (0.107) (0.111) 
% White 
 
0.097 0.133* 0.122 0.019 0.063 0.071 
  
(0.061) (0.057) (0.063) (0.056) (0.058) (0.057) 
% Housing Vacant 0.850*** 
 
0.856*** 0.433** 0.736*** 0.767*** 0.833*** 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.164) (0.163) (0.160) (0.157) (0.158) 
% Armed Forces -0.788*** -0.761*** 
 
-0.853*** -0.812*** -0.753*** -0.726*** 
 
(0.177) (0.195) 
 
(0.203) (0.187) (0.187) (0.183) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.376*** -0.261*** -0.389*** 
 
-0.313*** -0.442*** -0.367*** 
 
(0.053) (0.053) (0.056) 
 
(0.053) (0.046) (0.054) 
Total Population (Log) 2.600** 2.085* 3.329*** 1.220 
 
4.304*** 2.877*** 
 
(0.808) (0.878) (0.859) (0.889) 
 
(0.678) (0.837) 
Year Central City reached 50k** 
       1900 & earlier 10.138 7.657 10.392 18.252 15.283 
 
10.247 
        1910-1940 8.794 6.260 9.276 12.716 11.670 
 
9.105 
        1950-1960 6.364 3.432 7.074 6.982 8.328 
 
6.724 
        1970 and later 3.513 0.560 3.406 2.617 3.550 
 
3.836 
        Constant 41.457*** 42.489** 21.502 28.418* 68.053*** 27.177* 31.646* 
 
(9.833) (13.233) (12.766) (13.955) (6.972) (11.779) (12.575) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 12, below, contains the model analyses for the Gini index and the MSA 
population share that is residing outside of the largest city.  This particular measure of 
fragmentation produced a moderately strong, and somewhat significant, relationship 
with the Gini index.  The MSA share that is residing outside of the largest city 
maintained significance in 10 of the models.  Its greatest strength, in model 3, which is 
the model with control variable percent housing vacant, shows that for every unit 
increase in fragmentation there is a .204 average unit increase in the Gini index.   
For the control variables, the percentage of the housing units that are vacant 
maintained a positive, and significant, relationship with the Gini index.  In its greatest 
strength, in model 8, which includes all of the control variables except for percent white, 
shows that for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing units vacant there is a 
.833 average unit increase in the Gini index.  The percentage of the labor force in the 
armed forces continues to maintain a negative, and significant, relationship, with its 
greatest relationship in model 4.  In this model, for every unit increase in the percentage 
of the labor force in the armed forces there is a 1.158 average unit decrease in the Gini 
index.   
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The percentage of the housing units built after the Fair Housing Act continues to 
maintain a negative, and very significant, relationship with the Gini index, with its 
greatest strength in model 13.  In this model, for every unit increase in the percentage of 
the housing units vacant there is a .443 average unit decrease in the Gini index.  In this 
same model, for every unit increase in the log of the total population there is a 4.341 
average unit increase in the Gini index.   
In regards to Year Central City reached 50k, a similar pattern as seen in previous 
equations continues to be seen.  MSAs with central cities that reached 50k 1900 and 
prior had greater levels of residential segregation than its younger counterparts.  
Segregation levels decrease as the central cities become younger with Year Central City 
reached 50k 1970+ displaying a positive relationship with Gini.  Regardless of its 
positive relationship post-FHA, Year Central City reached 50k still maintains a 
relationship as seen in previous model equations.  In the Global F test, Year Central City 
reached 50k estimated a .0157 resulting in significance at the .05 level. 
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Table 12. Gini Analysis with MSA Population Share Residing Outside Largest City 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        MSA Population Share Residing 
Outside Largest City 0.189*** 0.174*** 0.204*** 0.146** 0.137*** 0.137** 0.173*** 
 
(0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.044) (0.039) (0.044) (0.041) 
% White 
 
0.089 
     
  
(0.072) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.309 
    
   
(0.180) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.158*** 
   
    
(0.225) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.407*** 
  
     
(0.046) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
3.976*** 
 
      
(0.801) 
 Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 
      
17.756 
        1910-1940 
      
12.208 
        1950-1960 
      
6.270 
        1970 and later 
      
1.121 
        Constant 58.178*** 52.410*** 59.664*** 62.647*** 83.553*** 8.921 48.727*** 
 
(3.220) (5.703) (3.320) (3.157) (3.941) (10.386) (4.274) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 12. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City 0.054 0.101* 0.059 0.107* 0.095* 0.000 0.045 
 
(0.039) (0.041) (0.041) (0.043) (0.038) (0.039) (0.040) 
% White 
 
0.054 0.105 0.076 -0.014 0.063 0.052 
  
(0.063) (0.059) (0.065) (0.057) (0.060) (0.059) 
% Housing Vacant 0.833*** 
 
0.825*** 0.413* 0.718*** 0.780*** 0.832*** 
 
(0.161) 
 
(0.166) (0.164) (0.160) (0.160) (0.161) 
% Armed Forces -0.717*** -0.667*** 
 
-0.753*** -0.717*** -0.745*** -0.678*** 
 
(0.178) (0.195) 
 
(0.203) (0.187) (0.186) (0.183) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.368*** -0.255*** -0.378*** 
 
-0.309*** -0.443*** -0.365*** 
 
(0.055) (0.054) (0.056) 
 
(0.053) (0.046) (0.055) 
Total Population (Log) 2.509** 1.750 2.999** 0.862 
 
4.341*** 2.782** 
 
(0.827) (0.917) (0.910) (0.925) 
 
(0.715) (0.884) 
Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 10.258 7.987 10.865 18.368 14.995 
 
10.118 
        1910-1940 8.912 6.483 9.707 12.860 11.607 
 
8.906 
        1950-1960 6.414 3.498 7.342 7.035 8.209 
 
6.486 
        1970 and later 3.747 0.950 3.753 3.010 3.919 
 
3.854 
        Constant 40.480*** 46.225*** 24.672 32.895* 67.190*** 27.079* 33.337** 
 
(9.816) (13.308) (12.934) (14.104) (6.998) (11.939) (12.750) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 13, below, contains the model analyses for the Gini index and the share of 
the MSA population residing within cities.  This measure of fragmentation maintains a 
weak relationship that is significant in a few models.  In addition, this measure of 
fragmentation has a different interpretation than the rest of the fragmentation measures.  
Fragmentation has its greatest strength in model 6 which includes control variable total 
population (log).  In this model, for every unit increase in the share of the population 
that is residing within cities there is a .173 average unit decrease in the Gini index.   
For the control variables, the percentage of the housing units that are vacant 
continues to maintain a moderately strong, and significant, relationship with the Gini 
index, with its greatest strength in model 8.  In this model, which includes all of the 
control variables except for percent white, shows that for every unit increase in the 
percentage of the housing units that are vacant there is a .865 average unit increase in the 
Gini index.   
In model 4, for every unit increase in the percentage of the labor force in the 
armed forces the Gini index decreases an average of 1.298 units.  The percentage of the 
housing units that were built after the Fair Housing Act continues to maintain 
moderately strong, and negative, relationship that is significant in all models.  Its 
greatest strength, in model 13, for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing 
units that were built post-FHA there is a.438 average unit decrease in the Gini index.   
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Year Central City reached 50k continues to display a pattern seen in previous 
model equations.  MSAs whose central city reached 50k earlier had greater levels of 
residential segregation than MSAs whose central city reached 50k later.  Year Central 
City reached 50k 1970+ still estimates a positive relationship with Gini.  In the Global F 
test, Year Central City reached 50k estimated a .0120 resulting in significance at the .01 
level. 
Table 14, below, contains the model analyses for the Gini index and the Gini 
concentration. This particular measure of fragmentation maintains a weak relationship 
with Gini that is almost always insignificant, with the exception of model 5.  In this 
model, which includes control variable percent housing built after FHA, for every unit 
increase in Gini concentration there is a .125 average unit decrease in the Gini index.   
For the control variables, the percentage of the population that is white 
maintained a weak relationship that is only significant in two models.  Its greatest 
strength, model 2, which contains no other variables, shows that for every unit increase 
in the percentage of the population that is white there is a .149 average unit increase in 
the Gini index.   
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The percentage of the housing units vacant continues to maintain a moderately 
strong, and positive, relationship that is mostly significant.  Its greatest strength, in 
model 8, which is the model that contains all other control variables with the exception 
of percent white, shows that for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing 
units that are vacant there is a .896 average unit increase in the Gini index.   
The percentage of the labor force in the armed forces continues to maintain its 
greatest strength in model 4 which is the model that contains no other control variables.  
In this model, for every unit increase in the percentage of the labor force in the armed 
forces there is a 1.267 average unit decrease in the Gini index.  The percentage of the 
housing units built after the Fair Housing Act continues to maintain its greatest strength 
in model 13.  In this model, for every unit increase in the percentage of the housing units 
built after the Fair Housing Act there is a .447 average unit decrease in the Gini index.  
The log of the total population continues to maintain its greatest strength in model 6 
which is the model that contains no other control variables.  In this model, for every unit 
increase in the total population (log) there is a 4.435 average unit increase in the Gini 
index.   
Year Central City reached 50k continues to maintain a relationship seen in 
previous models.  MSAs with older central cities have greater levels of segregation.  
Segregation levels decrease as the MSAs central city becomes younger.  In the Global F 
test, Year Central City reached 50k estimated a .0412 which results in significance at the 
.05 level.  
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The Gini Concentration displayed a weak, and mostly insignificant, relationship 
with the Gini index.  This weak relationship led to its discussion being quite short.  The 
percentage of the population that is white continues to display a very weak, and mostly 
insignificant, relationship.  As a result, discussion of percent white was limited.  The rest 
of the control variables continue to maintain very similar relationships with the Gini 
index as they did with the Dissimilarity index which is promising for the reliability of 
the results. 
Total Number of Cities 10k per 1 million MSA residents, the focus of this study, 
maintained a positive direction in all of the models regardless of significance.  In Model 
14, which contains all of the control variables, fragmentation is insignificant at the .05 
level two-tailed test.  Fragmentation is predicted to have a positive effect on the level of 
residential segregation.  As such, fragmentation proves to be significant at the .1 level 
one-tailed test.  Fragmentation leading to greater levels of residential segregation can 
thus be stated with greater confidence. 
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Table 13. Gini Analysis with MSA Population Share Residing in Largest City 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        MSA Population Share Residing 
within Cities -0.039 0.001 -0.049 -0.004 -0.027 -0.173*** -0.094* 
 
(0.050) (0.053) (0.051) (0.047) (0.042) (0.049) (0.043) 
% White 
 
0.157* 
     
  
(0.078) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.194 
    
   
(0.189) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.298*** 
   
    
(0.229) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.430*** 
  
     
(0.046) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
5.761*** 
 
      
(0.845) 
 Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 
      
17.514 
        1910-1940 
      
10.211 
        1950-1960 
      
4.422 
        1970 and later 
      
-0.910 
        Constant 73.916*** 59.041*** 76.259*** 73.126*** 96.133*** 7.101 68.716*** 
 
(3.674) (8.268) (4.324) (3.424) (3.909) (10.346) (3.570) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 13. Continued 
 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        MSA Population Share Residing within 
Cities -0.080* -0.091* -0.090* -0.072 -0.016 -0.067 -0.073 
 
(0.040) (0.043) (0.042) (0.046) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) 
% White 
 
0.065 0.097 0.098 -0.001 0.039 0.046 
  
(0.062) (0.058) (0.065) (0.060) (0.059) (0.058) 
% Housing Vacant 0.865*** 
 
0.860*** 0.471** 0.791*** 0.748*** 0.857*** 
 
(0.154) 
 
(0.159) (0.162) (0.160) (0.151) (0.154) 
% Armed Forces -0.695*** -0.664*** 
 
-0.771*** -0.773*** -0.710*** -0.660*** 
 
(0.177) (0.196) 
 
(0.204) (0.189) (0.185) (0.183) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.385*** -0.277*** -0.396*** 
 
-0.323*** -0.438*** -0.380*** 
 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.054) 
 
(0.054) (0.045) (0.053) 
Total Population (Log) 3.544*** 3.195*** 4.114*** 2.151* 
 
4.725*** 3.669*** 
 
(0.839) (0.913) (0.871) (0.929) 
 
(0.701) (0.855) 
Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 9.335 5.746 9.843 16.967 14.541 
 
9.365 
        1910-1940 8.339 4.581 9.061 11.323 10.320 
 
8.461 
        1950-1960 6.207 2.158 7.091 5.789 7.082 
 
6.351 
        1970 and later 3.963 0.357 3.997 2.373 2.802 
 
4.082 
        Constant 37.244*** 42.424** 22.193 27.387 75.011*** 28.582* 31.238* 
 
(9.905) (13.279) (12.650) (14.043) (7.605) (11.731) (12.531) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple 
categories. Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 14. Gini Analysis with Gini Concentration 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Gini Concentration -0.131 -0.121 -0.127 -0.081 -0.125* -0.069 0.007 
 
(0.075) (0.075) (0.076) (0.071) (0.063) (0.071) (0.067) 
% White 
 
0.149* 
     
  
(0.072) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.132 
    
   
(0.185) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.267*** 
   
    
(0.228) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.430*** 
  
     
(0.046) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
4.435*** 
 
      
(0.806) 
 Year Central City reached 50k* 
       1900 & earlier 
      
15.950 
        1910-1940 
      
8.705 
        1950-1960 
      
2.832 
        1970 and later 
      
-2.245 
        Constant 74.413*** 62.837*** 75.384*** 74.817*** 97.333*** 13.948 63.158*** 
 
(2.071) (5.981) (2.478) (1.935) (3.005) (11.153) (3.392) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 14. Continued 
   
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Gini Concentration -0.019 -0.004 -0.025 0.050 -0.016 -0.058 -0.011 
 
(0.056) (0.061) (0.058) (0.062) (0.058) (0.055) (0.056) 
% White 
 
0.095 0.126* 0.126 0.005 0.057 0.068 
  
(0.062) (0.057) (0.064) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) 
% Housing Vacant 0.896*** 
 
0.890*** 0.498** 0.800*** 0.791*** 0.881*** 
 
(0.155) 
 
(0.160) (0.163) (0.159) (0.151) (0.155) 
% Armed Forces -0.753*** -0.711*** 
 
-0.816*** -0.775*** -0.728*** -0.695*** 
 
(0.177) (0.198) 
 
(0.204) (0.189) (0.185) (0.183) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.390*** -0.274*** -0.400*** 
 
-0.328*** -0.447*** -0.381*** 
 
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) 
 
(0.054) (0.045) (0.054) 
Total Population (Log) 2.896*** 2.546** 3.511*** 1.701 
 
4.233*** 3.165*** 
 
(0.782) (0.870) (0.837) (0.881) 
 
(0.673) (0.815) 
Year Central City reached 
50k* 
       1900 & earlier 8.906 5.337 9.381 17.139 14.143 
 
9.055 
        1910-1940 7.484 3.754 8.196 11.286 9.953 
 
7.824 
        1950-1960 5.302 1.206 6.214 5.490 6.803 
 
5.660 
        1970 and later 3.030 -0.700 3.043 1.750 2.643 
 
3.332 
        Constant 41.351*** 42.904** 22.795 24.695 74.314*** 30.523* 31.747* 
 
(10.084) (13.820) (13.195) (14.470) (7.210) (12.191) (12.982) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple 
categories. Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Entropy and Fragmentation 
 
 As mentioned previously, alternative measures of segregation are utilized in this 
research to determine if results regarding the impact of fragmentation on residential 
segregation are consistent and “robust” when segregation is measured using different 
indices.  This section discusses the model analyses between the entropy index and the six 
measures of fragmentation.  The models in these analyses are identical to the models in 
previous tables with the exception that the dependent variable is substituted for the 
entropy index.  The results in the following tables indicate similar findings as previous 
analyses using dissimilarity and Gini produced. 
 Table 15, below, displays the model analyses for entropy and the total number of 
cities per 1 million MSA residents.  This fragmentation measure displays a very weak 
relationship with the entropy index that is insignificant in all models.  The control 
variables continue to maintain the same directional relationship with the entropy index 
as they did with previous measures of segregation.  All of the following discussions will 
focus on the greatest strength the control variable in question produced.   
 In model 14, which is the model with all control variables, for every unit increase 
in the percentage of the housing units that are vacant there is a 1.020 average unit 
increase in the entropy index.  In model 4, for every unit increase in the percentage of 
the labor force in the armed forces there is a 1.192 unit decrease in the entropy index.  
The percentage of the housing units built after the Fair Housing Act displayed its 
greatest strength in model 13.  In this model, for every unit increase in the percentage of 
the housing units built post-FHA there is a .481 average unit decrease in the entropy 
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index.  The log of the total population continues to maintain its strongest relationship in 
the model with no other control variables.  In this model, model 6, for every unit 
increase in the log of the total population the entropy index increases an average of 
6.349 units.   
 Year Central City reached 50k continues to maintain a relationship displayed in 
previous model equations.  MSAs with older central cities have greater levels of 
segregation than MSAs with younger central cities.  This pattern differs with central 
cities that reached 50k 1970+ having a positive relationship with segregation although 
still less segregation than older central cities.  Previous model equations display central 
cities that reached 50k 1970+ as having a negative relationship with residential 
segregation.  In the Global F test, Year Central City reached 50k estimated a .2188 
which proves to be insignificant. 
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Table 15. Entropy Analysis with Total Number of Cities per 1 Million Population 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities per 1 
Million -0.015 -0.016 -0.011 -0.026 -0.032 0.050 0.017 
 
(0.026) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) 
% White 
 
0.010 
     
  
(0.088) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.117 
    
   
(0.214) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.192*** 
   
    
(0.260) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.436*** 
  
     
(0.054) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
6.349*** 
 
      
(0.926) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
17.619 
        1910-1940 
      
8.669 
        1950-1960 
      
3.334 
        1970 and later 
      
-1.624 
        Constant 33.105*** 32.445*** 33.809*** 35.386*** 57.675*** -55.343*** 22.709*** 
 
(1.919) (6.322) (2.312) (1.897) (3.462) (13.020) (3.620) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 15. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities per 1 Million -0.016 0.021 -0.004 0.018 -0.028 -0.011 -0.009 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
% White 
 
-0.080 -0.032 -0.051 -0.147* -0.086 -0.087 
  
(0.075) (0.069) (0.077) (0.071) (0.070) (0.070) 
% Housing Vacant 1.016*** 
 
1.018*** 0.558** 0.960*** 0.947*** 1.020*** 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.193) (0.193) (0.195) (0.182) (0.189) 
% Armed Forces -0.616** -0.681** 
 
-0.784** -0.791*** -0.712** -0.684** 
 
(0.210) (0.232) 
 
(0.238) (0.223) (0.216) (0.217) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.409*** -0.285*** -0.430*** 
 
-0.361*** -0.481*** -0.416*** 
 
(0.064) (0.064) (0.066) 
 
(0.065) (0.054) (0.064) 
Total Population (Log) 4.151*** 3.458** 4.270*** 2.508* 
 
4.995*** 3.883*** 
 
(0.961) (1.049) (0.998) (1.057) 
 
(0.811) (0.984) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 8.679 4.582 9.084 16.774 14.596 
 
8.613 
        1910-1940 6.534 1.864 6.774 9.419 8.724 
 
6.246 
        1950-1960 4.861 -0.145 5.195 4.158 5.765 
 
4.531 
        1970 and later 3.807 -1.215 3.103 1.415 2.722 
 
3.402 
        Constant -13.479 5.443 -13.273 -10.883 49.230*** -7.827 -3.109 
 
(12.835) (16.256) (15.273) (16.754) (7.871) (14.159) (15.280) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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 Table 16, below, contains the model analyses for the entropy index and the total 
number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA residents.  This 
particular measure of fragmentation produces a very weak relationship with the entropy 
index that is insignificant in all of the model variations.  After a comparative review of 
this model variation with the models of the previous measures of segregation, there are 
no real differences.  Year Central City reached 50k continued to maintain a pattern seen 
in Table 14.  Year Central City reached 50k also estimated a .2853 in the Global F test 
resulting in the variable being insignificant.  
Table 17, below, contains the model analyses for the entropy index and the total 
number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents.  This 
particular measure of fragmentation produces a moderately strong, and somewhat 
significant relationship, with the entropy index.  Its greatest strength, in model 7, which 
is the model that contains Year Central City reached 50k as a control variable, shows 
that for every unit increase in fragmentation there is a .4 average unit increase in the 
entropy index.  The control variables continue to maintain their direction and 
significance.  Year Central City reached 50k proved to be significant at the .1 level in 
the Global F test. 
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Table 16. Entropy Analysis with Total Number of Cities 2500 per 1 Million Population 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 
Million 0.073 0.083 0.107 0.054 0.031 0.114 0.133* 
 
(0.066) (0.070) (0.072) (0.064) (0.058) (0.060) (0.062) 
% White 
 
-0.040 
     
  
(0.085) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.269 
    
   
(0.223) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.152*** 
   
    
(0.260) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.426*** 
  
     
(0.054) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
5.848*** 
 
      
(0.866) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
19.452 
        1910-1940 
      
11.100 
        1950-1960 
      
5.904 
        1970 and later 
      
0.304 
        Constant 29.890*** 32.600*** 31.019*** 32.000*** 54.102*** -49.085*** 17.573*** 
 
(2.274) (6.266) (2.458) (2.228) (3.658) (11.874) (4.262) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 16. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 
Million -0.045 0.099 -0.025 0.080 0.009 -0.059 -0.027 
 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.063) (0.065) (0.063) (0.058) (0.061) 
% White 
 
-0.093 -0.028 -0.061 -0.174* -0.078 -0.087 
  
(0.074) (0.069) (0.076) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) 
% Housing Vacant 1.042*** 
 
1.043*** 0.503* 0.890*** 1.015*** 1.038*** 
 
(0.200) 
 
(0.205) (0.199) (0.205) (0.197) (0.200) 
% Armed Forces -0.607** -0.689** 
 
-0.788** -0.779*** -0.702** -0.679** 
 
(0.209) (0.231) 
 
(0.237) (0.224) (0.216) (0.217) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.415*** -0.277*** -0.436*** 
 
-0.341*** -0.490*** -0.419*** 
 
(0.066) (0.064) (0.067) 
 
(0.065) (0.055) (0.066) 
Total Population (Log) 4.391*** 3.121** 4.362*** 2.233* 
 
5.157*** 4.023*** 
 
(0.929) (1.020) (0.989) (1.023) 
 
(0.778) (0.974) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 8.073 6.377 8.722 17.617 15.182 
 
8.239 
        1910-1940 5.913 3.749 6.396 10.489 9.150 
 
5.862 
        1950-1960 4.317 1.649 4.846 5.256 6.200 
 
4.192 
        1970 and later 3.365 0.077 2.887 2.206 2.557 
 
3.136 
        Constant -15.723 7.067 -13.819 -8.306 48.343*** -9.590 -4.358 
 
(11.865) (15.734) (14.967) (16.385) (8.110) (13.720) (14.948) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 17. Entropy Analysis with Total Number of Cities 10k+ per 1 Million Population 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities 10K per 1 
Million  0.293 0.293 0.332* 0.375* 0.305* 0.189 0.400** 
 
(0.158) (0.159) (0.162) (0.151) (0.138) (0.146) (0.142) 
% White 
 
-0.003 
     
  
(0.081) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.232 
    
   
(0.209) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.238*** 
   
    
(0.257) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.430*** 
  
     
(0.053) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
5.554*** 
 
      
(0.871) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
19.111 
        1910-1940 
      
11.098 
        1950-1960 
      
5.537 
        1970 and later 
      
-0.051 
        Constant 28.367*** 28.565*** 29.757*** 28.945*** 51.324*** -44.043*** 16.752*** 
 
(2.249) (6.651) (2.574) (2.139) (3.449) (11.540) (3.954) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 17. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities 10K per 1 
Million  0.209 0.342* 0.156 0.336* 0.321* 0.106 0.204 
 
(0.131) (0.136) (0.134) (0.141) (0.131) (0.125) (0.131) 
% White 
 
-0.062 -0.030 -0.036 -0.155* -0.094 -0.091 
  
(0.071) (0.066) (0.073) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067) 
% Housing Vacant 0.920*** 
 
0.964*** 0.510** 0.820*** 0.881*** 0.942*** 
 
(0.186) 
 
(0.191) (0.189) (0.189) (0.183) (0.187) 
% Armed Forces -0.636** -0.755** 
 
-0.852*** -0.822*** -0.731*** -0.715** 
 
(0.209) (0.230) 
 
(0.235) (0.221) (0.218) (0.217) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.384*** -0.276*** -0.416*** 
 
-0.328*** -0.471*** -0.395*** 
 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.065) 
 
(0.063) (0.053) (0.064) 
Total Population (Log) 3.933*** 2.686** 4.026*** 1.797 
 
4.982*** 3.580*** 
 
(0.956) (1.032) (1.004) (1.034) 
 
(0.791) (0.989) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 10.189 7.125 10.194 18.667 16.318 
 
10.051 
        1910-1940 8.202 4.593 7.976 11.693 10.998 
 
7.806 
        1950-1960 6.362 2.185 6.249 6.182 7.899 
 
5.904 
        1970 and later 4.390 0.277 3.554 2.666 3.623 
 
3.979 
        Constant -16.202 8.544 -13.699 -7.179 41.603*** -9.119 -3.704 
 
(11.634) (15.561) (14.921) (16.225) (8.269) (13.737) (14.869) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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 Table 18, below, contains the model analyses for the entropy index and the share 
of the MSA population residing outside of the largest city.  This particular measure of 
fragmentation maintains a weak, and somewhat significant, relationship with the entropy 
index.   
Fragmentation maintained significant relationships in the models that contained 
up to one other control variable but loses significance in models with additional control 
variables.  Its greatest strength, in model 3, which is the model with control variable the 
percentage of the housing units vacant, shows that for every unit increase in 
fragmentation there is a .187 average unit increase in the entropy index.  The additional 
control variables continue to maintain their direction and significance in all of the 
models which indicates that the previous model findings are reliable.  Year Central City 
reached 50k estimated a .2054 in the Global F test which proves to be insignificant.
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Table 18. Entropy Analysis with MSA Population Share Outside Largest City 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City 0.173*** 0.186*** 0.187*** 0.135** 0.122** 0.105* 0.147** 
 
(0.051) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.046) (0.049) (0.047) 
% White 
 
-0.081 
     
  
(0.082) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.279 
    
   
(0.204) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.034*** 
   
    
(0.260) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.408*** 
  
     
(0.053) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
5.234*** 
 
      
(0.884) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
18.778 
        1910-1940 
      
11.294 
        1950-1960 
      
5.784 
        1970 and later 
      
1.100 
        Constant 20.297*** 25.574*** 21.638*** 24.289*** 45.733*** -44.539*** 11.668* 
 
(3.633) (6.442) (3.755) (3.648) (4.627) (11.457) (4.961) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 18. Continued 
 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City 0.002 0.086 0.034 0.089 0.088 -0.012 0.020 
 
(0.046) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.045) (0.046) (0.048) 
% White 
 
-0.099 -0.049 -0.075 -0.190** -0.090 -0.101 
  
(0.075) (0.070) (0.077) (0.068) (0.070) (0.070) 
% Housing Vacant 0.979*** 
 
0.974*** 0.516** 0.825*** 0.941*** 0.981*** 
 
(0.191) 
 
(0.195) (0.192) (0.191) (0.187) (0.191) 
% Armed Forces -0.593** -0.656** 
 
-0.752** -0.722** -0.710** -0.669** 
 
(0.212) (0.231) 
 
(0.237) (0.224) (0.217) (0.218) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.399*** -0.274*** -0.417*** 
 
-0.329*** -0.478*** -0.405*** 
 
(0.065) (0.064) (0.066) 
 
(0.063) (0.054) (0.065) 
Total Population (Log) 4.321*** 2.570* 4.001*** 1.659 
 
5.187*** 3.787*** 
 
(0.985) (1.087) (1.070) (1.084) 
 
(0.835) (1.049) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 8.802 6.563 9.812 18.216 15.713 
 
9.074 
        1910-1940 6.713 3.871 7.516 11.106 10.403 
 
6.726 
        1950-1960 5.087 1.425 5.791 5.555 7.292 
 
4.947 
        1970 and later 3.778 0.146 3.469 2.633 3.657 
 
3.569 
        Constant -17.316 11.815 -11.926 -3.862 42.707*** -10.104 -3.373 
 
(11.689) (15.781) (15.195) (16.538) (8.370) (13.943) (15.133) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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 Table 19, below, contains the model analyses for the entropy index and the share 
of the MSA population residing within cities.  Fragmentation displayed a weak, but 
significant, relationship with entropy in model 6.  In this model, for every unit increase 
in the share of the population that resides within cities there is a .136 average unit 
decrease in the entropy index.  The additional control variables continue to maintain 
identical relationships, as they did in previous model analyses, providing greater 
confidence in the findings of the previous models.  Year Central City reached 50k 
estimated a .2032 in the Global F test which proves to be insignificant. 
Table 20, below, contains the model analyses for the entropy index and the Gini 
concentration.  Fragmentation, in this model variation, displayed a weak relationship 
that is insignificant in all of the models.  The additional control variables continue to 
maintain their directional relationships in the models with no real differences than the 
previous models.  Year Central City reached 50k estimated a .2490 in the Global F test 
which proves to be insignificant. 
 Total Number of Cities 10k per 1 Million MSA residents maintained similar 
significances seen in model analyses utilizing previous measures of segregation.  Total 
Number of Cities 10k per 1 Million MSA residents estimated a 1.55 t-score in model 14 
which contains all control variables.  This proves to be insignificant on a two-tailed test.  
On a one-tailed test, Total Number of Cities 10k per 1 Million MSA residents proves to 
be significant at the .1 level.  Because of maintenance of patterns seen in previous 
analyses, fragmentation can thus be stated as having a positive effect on residential 
segregation with greater confidence 
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Table 19. Entropy Analysis with MSA Population Share Residing Within Largest City 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        MSA Population Share Residing 
within Cities 0.018 0.018 0.011 0.050 0.030 -0.136* -0.034 
 
(0.055) (0.060) (0.056) (0.053) (0.048) (0.054) (0.049) 
% White 
 
0.001 
     
  
(0.088) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.131 
    
   
(0.211) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.199*** 
   
    
(0.261) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.430*** 
  
     
(0.054) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
6.628*** 
 
      
(0.935) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
17.791 
        1910-1940 
      
8.840 
        1950-1960 
      
3.428 
        1970 and later 
      
-1.272 
        Constant 30.867*** 30.741** 32.449*** 30.138*** 53.102*** -46.004*** 26.077*** 
 
(4.096) (9.308) (4.828) (3.911) (4.533) (11.446) (4.106) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
 
 109 
 
 
Table 19. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        MSA Population Share Residing within 
Cities -0.044 -0.082 -0.078 -0.061 0.007 -0.059 -0.061 
 
(0.047) (0.051) (0.049) (0.053) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
% White 
 
-0.091 -0.063 -0.056 -0.169* -0.115 -0.113 
  
(0.074) (0.069) (0.076) (0.071) (0.069) (0.069) 
% Housing Vacant 0.965*** 
 
0.986*** 0.564** 0.904*** 0.896*** 0.983*** 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.187) (0.190) (0.191) (0.177) (0.184) 
% Armed Forces -0.560** -0.652** 
 
-0.767** -0.782*** -0.676** -0.646** 
 
(0.212) (0.232) 
 
(0.239) (0.225) (0.217) (0.217) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.398*** -0.294*** -0.427*** 
 
-0.344*** -0.471*** -0.411*** 
 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.064) 
 
(0.064) (0.053) (0.063) 
Total Population (Log) 4.691*** 3.837*** 4.817*** 2.736* 
 
5.439*** 4.381*** 
 
(1.002) (1.080) (1.025) (1.084) 
 
(0.822) (1.016) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 8.886 4.659 9.277 17.048 14.988 
 
8.810 
        1910-1940 7.026 2.275 7.313 9.826 8.944 
 
6.725 
        1950-1960 5.483 0.317 5.851 4.517 5.999 
 
5.126 
        1970 and later 4.249 -0.316 3.873 2.104 2.428 
 
3.956 
        Constant -19.167 8.547 -13.146 -8.456 47.979*** -8.165 -4.282 
 
(11.835) (15.709) (14.883) (16.394) (9.042) (13.745) (14.894) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 20. Entropy Analysis with Gini Concentration 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Gini Concentration -0.112 -0.113 -0.108 -0.067 -0.106 -0.033 0.026 
 
(0.084) (0.085) (0.085) (0.081) (0.074) (0.078) (0.076) 
% White 
 
-0.016 
     
  
(0.081) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.118 
    
   
(0.206) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.139*** 
   
    
(0.261) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.428*** 
  
     
(0.054) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
5.622*** 
 
      
(0.880) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
17.399 
        1910-1940 
      
8.502 
        1950-1960 
      
2.981 
        1970 and later 
      
-1.740 
        Constant 34.997*** 36.235*** 35.866*** 35.360*** 57.837*** -41.656*** 23.287*** 
 
(2.313) (6.749) (2.768) (2.219) (3.500) (12.182) (3.859) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 20. Continued 
   
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Gini Concentration -0.000 -0.002 -0.023 0.057 -0.016 -0.044 -0.010 
 
(0.067) (0.072) (0.068) (0.073) (0.069) (0.064) (0.067) 
% White 
 
-0.064 -0.038 -0.032 -0.174* -0.099 -0.095 
  
(0.073) (0.067) (0.074) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
% Housing Vacant 0.982*** 
 
1.012*** 0.588** 0.902*** 0.932*** 1.003*** 
 
(0.184) 
 
(0.188) (0.189) (0.189) (0.176) (0.184) 
% Armed Forces -0.595** -0.694** 
 
-0.807*** -0.776*** -0.694** -0.676** 
 
(0.210) (0.233) 
 
(0.238) (0.224) (0.217) (0.217) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.400*** -0.291*** -0.431*** 
 
-0.346*** -0.478*** -0.413*** 
 
(0.063) (0.064) (0.065) 
 
(0.064) (0.053) (0.064) 
Total Population (Log) 4.336*** 3.254** 4.295*** 2.373* 
 
5.024*** 3.958*** 
 
(0.928) (1.024) (0.979) (1.025) 
 
(0.787) (0.964) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 8.754 4.311 8.861 17.298 14.906 
 
8.544 
        1910-1940 6.662 1.551 6.547 9.934 8.848 
 
6.185 
        1950-1960 5.046 -0.527 5.082 4.360 5.973 
 
4.544 
        1970 and later 3.750 -1.264 3.045 1.614 2.465 
 
3.326 
        Constant -17.307 8.878 -12.533 -11.463 49.405*** -6.892 -3.826 
 
(11.954) (16.272) (15.443) (16.841) (8.571) (14.263) (15.367) 
        Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Correlation Ratio and Fragmentation 
 
 The final measure of segregation is the correlation ratio.  This measure of 
segregation is used in this section to determine the accuracy of the previous model 
analyses utilizing dissimilarity, Gini, and entropy.  The goal is to identify similarities 
and differences across the previous model analyses to determine the reliability of the 
findings.  Fragmentation continued to maintain similar patterns seen in previous model 
analyses.   
 This particular section will provide greater focus on the fragmentation measure 
as opposed to the control variables.  The control variable discussion will be limited 
because their relationship continues to be maintained and is nearly identical to that of the 
previous models, with the exception of percent white.  The percentage of the population 
that is white is beginning to display a moderate, negative, relationship with the 
correlation ratio that is mostly significant.  In every model analysis, the percentage of the 
population that is white produced significant results, where for every unit increase in 
percent white there would be a decrease in the correlation ratio.   
 The total number of cities per 1 million MSA residents (Table 21) and the total 
number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population per 1 million MSA residents (Table 
22) displayed weak, insignificant, relationships.  The total number of cities with a 
minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents (Table 23) displayed 
moderately strong, and positive, relationships that were mostly significant.  Its greatest 
strength, in model 7, for every unit increase in fragmentation the correlation ratio 
increased an average of .477 units.  The MSA population share residing outside of the 
 113 
 
largest city (Table 24) estimated a weak to moderate relationship with the correlation 
ratio that is significant in three models.  Its greatest strength, in model 2, shows that for 
every unit increase in fragmentation there is a .201 average unit increase in the 
correlation ratio.  The MSA population share residing within largest city (Table 25) 
estimated insignificant results in every model.  The Gini concentration (Table 26) also 
estimated insignificant results.  
 Year Central City reached 50k maintained a similar pattern seen in previous 
model equations.  MSAs with older central cities had greater levels of residential 
segregation than MSAs whose central city was younger.  In the Global F test, Year 
Central City reached 50k proved to be insignificant in all of the models with the 
exception of Table 23.  Table 23 contains Total Number of Cities 10k per 1 million MSA 
residents.  In this table, Year Central City reached 50k estimated a .0977 which proves 
to be significant at the .1 level. 
 Total Number of Cities 10k per 1 million MSA residents estimated a 1.34 t-value 
in model 14 which contains all control variables.  This proves to be insignificant in a 
two-tailed test but significant at the .1 level in a one-tailed test.  Fragmentation continues 
to maintain direction and strength as seen in previous models allowing one to conclude 
with greater confidence that as fragmentation increases in an MSA so will the amount of 
residential segregation. 
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Table 21. Correlation Ratio Analysis with Total Number of Cities per 1 Million Population 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities per 1 
Million -0.043 -0.016 -0.044 -0.053 -0.059* 0.029 -0.010 
 
(0.031) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) (0.029) 
        % White 
 
-0.215* 
     
  
(0.104) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
0.039 
    
   
(0.254) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.127*** 
   
    
(0.315) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.408*** 
  
     
(0.068) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
7.063*** 
 
      
(1.115) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
19.021 
        1910-1940 
      
9.453 
        1950-1960 
      
3.875 
        1970 and later 
      
-0.864 
        Constant 34.799*** 49.467*** 34.563*** 36.956*** 57.782*** -63.592*** 23.438*** 
 
(2.277) (7.425) (2.746) (2.294) (4.355) (15.671) (4.476) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 21. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities per 1 Million -0.039 0.023 -0.007 0.013 -0.031 -0.015 -0.013 
 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
        % White 
 
-0.313** -0.257** -0.287** -0.380*** -0.317*** -0.321*** 
  
(0.094) (0.087) (0.093) (0.088) (0.088) (0.088) 
% Housing Vacant 1.212*** 
 
1.226*** 0.783*** 1.169*** 1.146*** 1.228*** 
 
(0.246) 
 
(0.243) (0.234) (0.243) (0.230) (0.239) 
% Armed Forces -0.538 -0.786** 
 
-0.886** -0.895** -0.821** -0.790** 
 
(0.274) (0.292) 
 
(0.290) (0.278) (0.274) (0.274) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.377*** -0.243** -0.417*** 
 
-0.347*** -0.495*** -0.400*** 
 
(0.083) (0.080) (0.082) 
 
(0.081) (0.068) (0.081) 
Total Population (Log) 4.801*** 3.299* 4.258*** 2.488 
 
5.398*** 3.812** 
 
(1.250) (1.317) (1.256) (1.284) 
 
(1.026) (1.243) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 11.560 6.462 11.859 19.175 17.188 
 
11.315 
        1910-1940 8.590 2.250 8.135 10.581 9.958 
 
7.525 
        1950-1960 6.316 -0.528 5.868 4.742 6.313 
 
5.102 
        1970 and later 5.395 -1.656 3.558 1.990 3.235 
 
3.903 
        Constant -26.208 22.335 0.303 4.552 63.413*** 3.793 12.040 
 
(16.691) (20.412) (19.216) (20.362) (9.795) (17.918) (19.302) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple 
categories. Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 22. Correlation Ratio Analysis with Total Number of Cities 2500 per 1 Million Population 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 
Million 0.013 0.079 0.024 -0.004 -0.025 0.062 0.073 
 
(0.079) (0.082) (0.086) (0.077) (0.074) (0.073) (0.077) 
% White 
 
-0.263** 
     
  
(0.100) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.080 
    
   
(0.267) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.076*** 
   
    
(0.316) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.397*** 
  
     
(0.068) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
6.761*** 
 
      
(1.042) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
20.514 
        1910-1940 
      
11.255 
        1950-1960 
      
5.865 
        1970 and later 
      
0.354 
        Constant 31.656*** 49.641*** 31.992*** 33.627*** 54.198*** -59.639*** 18.995*** 
 
(2.718) (7.367) (2.947) (2.712) (4.629) (14.290) (5.314) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 22. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities 2500+ per 1 
Million -0.123 0.096 -0.057 0.046 -0.023 -0.094 -0.060 
 
(0.078) (0.075) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.073) (0.077) 
% White 
 
-0.323*** -0.248** -0.290** -0.403*** -0.301*** -0.315*** 
  
(0.093) (0.086) (0.093) (0.086) (0.088) (0.088) 
% Housing Vacant 1.297*** 
 
1.287*** 0.756** 1.132*** 1.261*** 1.281*** 
 
(0.260) 
 
(0.257) (0.243) (0.255) (0.249) (0.253) 
% Armed Forces -0.521 -0.796** 
 
-0.891** -0.884** -0.807** -0.784** 
 
(0.271) (0.290) 
 
(0.289) (0.279) (0.273) (0.274) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.394*** -0.236** -0.430*** 
 
-0.333*** -0.511*** -0.412*** 
 
(0.085) (0.080) (0.084) 
 
(0.081) (0.069) (0.083) 
Total Population (Log) 5.393*** 2.943* 4.447*** 2.299 
 
5.627*** 4.056** 
 
(1.206) (1.283) (1.244) (1.246) 
 
(0.983) (1.229) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 9.864 8.169 11.024 19.676 17.468 
 
10.468 
        1910-1940 6.833 4.038 7.262 11.190 9.961 
 
6.646 
        1950-1960 4.753 1.161 5.054 5.344 6.324 
 
4.300 
        1970 and later 4.201 -0.407 3.080 2.455 2.784 
 
3.368 
        Constant -30.983* 24.397 -0.624 6.418 63.431*** 1.412 10.295 
 
(15.401) (19.805) (18.815) (19.958) (10.084) (17.336) (18.865) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 23. Correlation Ratio Analysis with Total Number of Cities 10k+ per 1 Million Population 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Total Number of Cities 10K per 1 
Million  0.347 0.328 0.373 0.423* 0.358* 0.225 0.477** 
 
(0.189) (0.187) (0.194) (0.184) (0.175) (0.174) (0.176) 
% White 
 
-0.227* 
     
  
(0.095) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.155 
    
   
(0.250) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.156*** 
   
    
(0.313) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.396*** 
  
     
(0.067) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
6.520*** 
 
      
(1.041) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
21.560 
        1910-1940 
      
13.078 
        1950-1960 
      
7.407 
        1970 and later 
      
1.262 
        Constant 27.575*** 45.079*** 28.506*** 28.114*** 48.723*** -57.424*** 13.804** 
 
(2.679) (7.816) (3.074) (2.604) (4.369) (13.791) (4.892) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 23. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Total Number of Cities 10K per 1 
Million  0.241 0.389* 0.167 0.348* 0.337* 0.108 0.222 
 
(0.171) (0.171) (0.168) (0.172) (0.163) (0.158) (0.166) 
% White 
 
-0.292** -0.257** -0.275** -0.390*** -0.327*** -0.327*** 
  
(0.090) (0.084) (0.089) (0.084) (0.085) (0.085) 
% Housing Vacant 1.060*** 
 
1.163*** 0.726** 1.018*** 1.073*** 1.137*** 
 
(0.244) 
 
(0.241) (0.231) (0.236) (0.232) (0.236) 
% Armed Forces -0.535 -0.870** 
 
-0.952** -0.927*** -0.840** -0.822** 
 
(0.273) (0.289) 
 
(0.287) (0.276) (0.276) (0.274) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.336*** -0.232** -0.401*** 
 
-0.311*** -0.483*** -0.376*** 
 
(0.083) (0.079) (0.082) 
 
(0.078) (0.067) (0.081) 
Total Population (Log) 4.777*** 2.426 4.018** 1.807 
 
5.419*** 3.506** 
 
(1.249) (1.300) (1.265) (1.260) 
 
(1.002) (1.252) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 13.391 9.359 13.057 21.103 19.029 
 
12.893 
        1910-1940 10.668 5.359 9.434 12.944 12.365 
 
9.240 
        1950-1960 8.275 2.129 7.016 6.885 8.574 
 
6.620 
        1970 and later 5.997 0.042 4.024 3.262 4.163 
 
4.512 
        Constant -34.075* 25.793 -0.484 7.691 55.368*** 1.948 11.002 
 
(15.198) (19.589) (18.793) (19.781) (10.330) (17.396) (18.815) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 24. Correlation Ratio Analysis with MSA Population Share Residing Outside Largest City 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City 0.151* 0.201** 0.159* 0.115 0.103 0.068 0.123* 
 
(0.062) (0.063) (0.063) (0.062) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
% White 
 
-0.312** 
     
  
(0.097) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.170 
    
   
(0.247) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-0.962** 
   
    
(0.319) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.377*** 
  
     
(0.068) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
6.383*** 
 
      
(1.065) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
20.597 
        1910-1940 
      
12.226 
        1950-1960 
      
6.643 
        1970 and later 
      
1.607 
        Constant 21.750*** 42.018*** 22.569*** 25.466*** 45.259*** -57.323*** 12.209 
 
(4.384) (7.601) (4.548) (4.472) (5.908) (13.803) (6.210) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 24. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        MSA Population Share Residing Outside 
Largest City -0.040 0.099 0.036 0.086 0.087 -0.019 0.020 
 
(0.060) (0.062) (0.061) (0.062) (0.056) (0.058) (0.060) 
% White 
 
-0.336*** -0.278** -0.313*** -0.426*** -0.320*** -0.338*** 
  
(0.094) (0.088) (0.093) (0.084) (0.089) (0.089) 
% Housing Vacant 1.177*** 
 
1.174*** 0.737** 1.028*** 1.143*** 1.182*** 
 
(0.249) 
 
(0.245) (0.234) (0.239) (0.237) (0.241) 
% Armed Forces -0.519 -0.757** 
 
-0.852** -0.825** -0.820** -0.773** 
 
(0.276) (0.291) 
 
(0.289) (0.279) (0.274) (0.275) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.369*** -0.231** -0.402*** 
 
-0.312*** -0.492*** -0.388*** 
 
(0.085) (0.080) (0.083) 
 
(0.079) (0.068) (0.082) 
Total Population (Log) 5.529*** 2.284 3.998** 1.712 
 
5.673*** 3.751** 
 
(1.284) (1.366) (1.346) (1.321) 
 
(1.057) (1.326) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 10.872 8.754 12.632 20.538 18.356 
 
11.781 
        1910-1940 7.971 4.573 8.927 12.210 11.655 
 
8.014 
        1950-1960 6.007 1.294 6.514 6.122 7.861 
 
5.539 
        1970 and later 4.738 -0.086 3.924 3.143 4.128 
 
4.040 
        Constant -35.223* 29.558 1.375 10.783 56.890*** 0.601 11.252 
 
(15.231) (19.833) (19.126) (20.141) (10.447) (17.644) (19.122) 
        Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple 
categories. Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 25. Correlation Analysis with MSA Population Share Residing Within Largest City 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        MSA Population Share Residing 
within Cities 0.053 -0.008 0.052 0.083 0.064 -0.122 -0.004 
 
(0.066) (0.070) (0.067) (0.064) (0.061) (0.065) (0.061) 
% White 
 
-0.238* 
     
  
(0.104) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.012 
    
   
(0.251) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.129*** 
   
    
(0.317) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.397*** 
  
     
(0.068) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
7.519*** 
 
      
(1.125) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
19.355 
        1910-1940 
      
9.775 
        1950-1960 
      
4.259 
        1970 and later 
      
-0.716 
        Constant 28.249*** 50.832*** 28.394*** 27.562*** 48.780*** -58.954*** 22.829*** 
 
(4.873) (10.932) (5.749) (4.743) (5.723) (13.772) (5.079) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 25. Continued 
        
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        MSA Population Share Residing within 
Cities -0.033 -0.114 -0.107 -0.088 -0.018 -0.088 -0.088 
 
(0.062) (0.064) (0.061) (0.064) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061) 
% White 
 
-0.332*** -0.302*** -0.304** -0.416*** -0.359*** -0.359*** 
  
(0.093) (0.086) (0.092) (0.088) (0.088) (0.087) 
% Housing Vacant 1.118*** 
 
1.178*** 0.774*** 1.094*** 1.074*** 1.176*** 
 
(0.240) 
 
(0.235) (0.230) (0.237) (0.224) (0.232) 
% Armed Forces -0.462 -0.742* 
 
-0.851** -0.876** -0.768** -0.736** 
 
(0.277) (0.291) 
 
(0.289) (0.279) (0.274) (0.274) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.353*** -0.253** -0.412*** 
 
-0.325*** -0.481*** -0.394*** 
 
(0.082) (0.079) (0.080) 
 
(0.079) (0.067) (0.079) 
Total Population (Log) 5.511*** 3.878** 5.024*** 2.952* 
 
6.046*** 4.528*** 
 
(1.309) (1.354) (1.288) (1.315) 
 
(1.038) (1.282) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 11.839 6.636 12.131 19.494 17.985 
 
11.599 
        1910-1940 9.171 2.896 8.885 11.189 10.511 
 
8.216 
        1950-1960 7.090 0.210 6.785 5.376 6.862 
 
5.960 
        1970 and later 5.638 -0.400 4.613 2.933 3.129 
 
4.707 
        Constant -36.758* 25.741 0.314 6.402 64.421*** 3.562 10.402 
 
(15.462) (19.690) (18.702) (19.880) (11.244) (17.368) (18.792) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 26. Correlation Ratio Analysis with Gini Concentration 
        
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        Gini Concentration -0.134 -0.150 -0.133 -0.093 -0.128 -0.041 0.014 
 
(0.100) (0.099) (0.101) (0.099) (0.093) (0.093) (0.094) 
% White 
 
-0.243* 
     
  
(0.095) 
     % Housing Vacant 
  
-0.026 
    
   
(0.246) 
    % Armed Forces 
   
-1.037** 
   
    
(0.317) 
   % Housing Built After FHA 
    
-0.394*** 
  
     
(0.068) 
  Total Population (Log) 
     
6.597*** 
 
      
(1.051) 
 Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 
      
19.389 
        1910-1940 
      
9.832 
        1950-1960 
      
4.264 
        1970 and later 
      
-0.765 
        Constant 35.456*** 54.370*** 35.644*** 35.786*** 56.465*** -54.493*** 22.127*** 
 
(2.756) (7.915) (3.301) (2.694) (4.429) (14.558) (4.769) 
        Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
       (continued) 
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Table 26. Continued 
       
 
(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
        Gini Concentration -0.003 -0.029 -0.053 0.026 -0.045 -0.078 -0.039 
 
(0.087) (0.090) (0.086) (0.088) (0.086) (0.081) (0.084) 
% White 
 
-0.298** -0.269** -0.274** -0.413*** -0.336*** -0.335*** 
  
(0.091) (0.084) (0.090) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) 
% Housing Vacant 1.131*** 
 
1.215*** 0.804*** 1.106*** 1.130*** 1.205*** 
 
(0.239) 
 
(0.236) (0.230) (0.235) (0.223) (0.232) 
% Armed Forces -0.487 -0.796** 
 
-0.901** -0.872** -0.792** -0.774** 
 
(0.274) (0.292) 
 
(0.289) (0.279) (0.274) (0.274) 
% Housing Built After FHA -0.355*** -0.253** -0.421*** 
 
-0.334*** -0.493*** -0.400*** 
 
(0.083) (0.081) (0.082) 
 
(0.080) (0.067) (0.081) 
Total Population (Log) 5.242*** 3.061* 4.293*** 2.373 
 
5.398*** 3.909** 
 
(1.210) (1.285) (1.232) (1.246) 
 
(0.995) (1.218) 
Year Central City reached 50k 
       1900 & earlier 11.709 5.880 11.331 19.449 17.251 
 
10.969 
        1910-1940 8.865 1.612 7.597 10.814 9.812 
 
7.182 
        1950-1960 6.742 -1.125 5.587 4.793 6.381 
 
4.970 
        1970 and later 5.257 -1.756 3.440 2.104 2.911 
 
3.762 
        Constant -35.237* 27.599 2.362 4.930 64.891*** 6.235 12.328 
 
(15.594) (20.419) (19.418) (20.479) (10.654) (18.029) (19.405) 
Observations 205 205 205 205 205 205 205 
Note: Regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Year Central City reached 50k is a dummy variable with multiple categories. 
Central Cities that never reached 50k are the reference group. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 (two-tailed tests) 
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CHAPTER VII  
CONCLUSION 
 The results of this thesis show that as political fragmentation increases in an 
MSA, so will the amount of residential segregation.  Political fragments are 
conceptualized as “autonomous jurisdictions”, “administrative boundaries”, and any type 
of boundary that complements “urban sorting” (Bischoff 2008:182; Weiher 1991:166).  
Utilizing CDPs from the U.S. Decennial Census, I was able to operationalize 
fragmentation in several ways, some of which were commonly used methods in previous 
research.   
 A goal of this thesis was to consider alternative measures of fragmentation.  The 
results show that the operationalization of fragmentation will greatly influence whether 
analysis will detect effects of fragmentation or not.  Alternative measures of 
fragmentation are not interchangeable and vary in terms of conceptual rigor and appeal.  
Alternative measures of fragmentation also vary in the strength of their relationships 
with segregation.  Based on my analyses, I conclude that some measures of 
fragmentation are more useful than others while others are less useful.  I concluded that 
the operationalization of political fragmentation as the total number of cities per 1 
million MSA residents and the total number of cities with a minimum 2,500 population 
per 1 million MSA residents were least ideal to measure fragmentation.  The issue at 
hand is that a CDP can have a small-to-zero population, thus negating the concept of 
population density. Fragmentation measures can become corrupt, and useless, if CDPs 
with zero to small populations are included in the operationalization. 
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 A measure of fragmentation that was quite useful for this study was the total 
number of cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents.  This 
operationalization is more defensible on conceptuality and methodological grounds.  In 
addition, the findings based on this measure suggest that fragmentation may very well 
have a positive effect on residential segregation.  Utilizing this measure of 
fragmentation, residential segregation remained consistently positive.  In conjunction 
with all control variables, this measure of fragmentation did not reach significance at the 
two-tailed 0.05 level, but does reach significance at the one-tailed 0.10 level.  Attaining 
statistical significance at the conventional 0.05 level for the effect of total number of 
cities with a minimum 10,000 population per 1 million MSA residents varied across 
model specifications involving different combinations of control variables.  The 
direction of the effect was always positive and always attained statistical significance at 
the less demanding 0.10 level.  Given this pattern in the results, it is quite possible that, 
including a greater number of data points may increase the confidence of fragmentation. 
 Investigating the effects of different measures of fragmentation allowed for 
greater overall confidence in understanding the nature of its relationship with residential 
segregation.  Based on the full array of results reviewed in this study, I conclude that the 
evidence suggests that fragmentation has positive effects on residential segregation when 
it is operationalized in a way that is most appropriate on conceptual and methodological 
grounds.  Accordingly, I conclude that as the number of political fragments increase in 
an MSA, so will the amount of residential segregation between blacks and non-Hispanic 
whites. 
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Multicollinearity 
 Fragmentation varying in level of statistical significance across different model 
specifications was cause for concern that there may have been an issue of 
multicollinearity (O’Brien 2007:673).  In the analyses, percentage of the labor force in 
the armed forces, percentage of housing units built post-FHA, and year central city 
reached 50k had varying effects on fragmentation.  For example, in models 7, 9, 11, and 
12, fragmentation may be significant with year central city reached 50k, but is 
insignificant in model 13, when year central city reached 50k is removed from the 
equation. 
 Tolerance tests were conducted to test the presence of multicollinearity in the 
analyses.  In this, each control variable was taken as the dependent variable in any 
analysis where it is regressed on the other independent variables in the model.  These 
regressions help indicate whether there would be sufficient amount of variance left in 
each independent variable to test the hypothesis (O’Brien 2007:674).  If the tolerance 
value became too low it could signify the presence of multicollinearity and further tests 
would be needed (O’Brien 2007:674).  The tolerance tests performed in this study 
indicate that multicollinearity was not an issue.  The proportion of variance left in each 
independent variable net of its associations with the other independent variables was 
sufficient to determine multicollinearity a non-issue. 
Tolerance and power 
 Tolerance analysis speaks to the question of what proportion of the initial 
variation in the independent variable remains “available”, after controls are introduced, 
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to be used to estimate the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable of interest.  Tolerance tests are an appropriate first step, but they do 
not directly answer the questions of (a) whether the initial variation in the independent 
variable was adequate for assessing its relationship with the dependent variable, and (b) 
whether the remaining variation net of controls is adequate for assessing its relationship 
with the dependent variable.   
 A more rigorous answer to these questions would require that one conduct a 
formal “power analysis” to determine if substantively meaningful effects can be found 
under the study design.  Formal power tests first require that one establish the minimum 
effect (minimum value of the regression coefficient) that is meaningful for the purposes 
of the study, and then perform a mathematical analysis to determine whether study 
design elements, such as variation in the independent variable and sample size, will 
sustain reliable detection of this effect in statistical analysis.  Rigorous power analysis in 
the context of multivariate controls is complex and beyond the scope of this study.   
 A more rudimentary approach is to examine the initial variation in the 
independent variable and compare that with the variation remaining after it is regressed 
on controls.  Two relevant statistics to consider are the standard deviation for the initial 
independent variable and the standard deviation of the residuals from the relevant 
tolerance regression.  The residuals from the tolerance regression indicate the variation 
in the independent variable that is free of association with the control variables.  One 
then considers whether the variation in the independent variable indicated by these 
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statistics is adequate for testing the relationship between the dependent variable and the 
independent variable at the level of statistical significance desired.   
 For perspective, one may also examine the interdecile range for the distribution 
of the initial values of the independent variable and for the distribution of the residuals 
from the regression equation.  Intuitively, one considers the question of whether the 
magnitude of the difference between cases with low and high values on the independent 
variable – as measured by the interdecile range – is large enough create a meaningful 
difference on the dependent variables.   
 Rigorous power analysis is especially important when one wishes to conclude 
that “null” findings – that is, findings of no effect – are trustworthy and are not readily 
attributed to inadequate study design.  I view this as a lesser priority for future research.  
The findings for fragmentation here show that it consistently has effects that are either 
statistically significant or are “near” statistical significance at conventional levels.  
Based on this I believe the first priority for future research should be to focus attention 
on improving sample design by gather more data points (i.e., increasing sample size) and 
seeking further improvements in the measurement of fragmentation to better capture its 
effects.  If at that point fragmentation continues to fail to consistently attain statistical 
significance, rigorous power analysis may be appropriate at that point to better establish 
that the finding of non-significant effects is “real”.  For now, however, the evidence 
suggests to me that fragmentation impacts segregation and that the effect may become 
clearer in future studies that improve the study design for assessing the impacts of 
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fragmentation.   I now note limitations of the current study design and how they might 
be improved in future studies. 
Limitations 
 This study was an attempt to measure the effect political fragmentation has on 
residential segregation in the U.S.  It was a concerted effort to cover disputes that may 
arise in the design of the study, but still recognizes its limitations.  Political 
fragmentation, or the measure of jurisdictions and municipalities, is a phenomenon that 
has intrigued social researchers for many decades.  CDPs used in this study may not 
have been an ideal measure of fragmentation since they do not reflect actual 
administrative boundaries within an MSA.  Alternative measures of fragmentation can 
be used in future research that will incorporate administrative boundaries in their 
operationalization. 
 In addition, researchers have used several ways to measure residential 
segregation.  Currently, there is a consensus that the dissimilarity index provides a 
fruitful way of measuring the degree to which two groups are segregated in an MSA.  It 
is widely used and accepted.  Unfortunately, it is recognized that the dissimilarity index 
can be biased, especially when trying to measure small populations.  In an effort to 
reduce bias, sample criteria was set for the study to remove MSAs with small 
populations.  This requirement removes over a hundred MSAs from the analysis, thus 
limiting the study further. 
 These limitations present a direction for future research.  An analysis attempting 
to test the same hypothesis could use a measure of fragmentation that uses actual count 
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data of the municipalities and other jurisdictions within an MSA.  Fragmentation may 
also be measured utilizing school districts across the U.S., as they do vary in size and 
shape across metropolitan areas.  School districts may be few and large in some 
metropolitan areas while small and many in other metropolitan areas.  Fragmentation 
may also be measured by a metropolitan’s use of zoning regulations.  Utilizing zoning 
regulations would limit a researcher to a single or few metropolitan areas.  This would 
be due to the extensive amount of research needed in each incorporated location’s 
planning department.  In addition, the use a segregation measure that is less biased 
would be fruitful to the analysis.  A segregation measure that would allow small 
populations to be measured without bias would be ideal.  This would allow all of the 
MSAs in the U.S. to be analyzed.  Increasing the sample size in this manner could alter 
the results of the analysis or strengthen the findings of this thesis. 
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